Demand property with intent to steal

Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 99

[5-5600] Introduction

Last reviewed: September 2025

The following suggested direction deals with demanding property with menaces or by force with intent to steal under s 99 of the Crimes Act 1900. It should be adapted where the aggravating form of the offence under s 99(2) (in company) is charged.

[5-5610] Suggested direction — demand property with intent to steal (s 99)

Last reviewed: September 2025

The accused is charged with demanding property [with menaces/by force], with intent to steal property.

To prove the accused is guilty, the Crown must prove beyond reasonable doubt each of the following elements which make up the offence:

1. 

The accused made a demand for property, and

2. 

The demand was accompanied by [menaces/force], and

3. 

The accused intended to steal the property.

You can only find the accused guilty if the Crown proves each element beyond reasonable doubt. If the Crown fails to prove any one of them you must find the accused not guilty.

I will now explain to you what each element means.

1. The accused made a demand for property

A demand can be express or implied. In the present case, the Crown alleges the accused made their demand of [the alleged victim] expressly by … [specify the Crown case as to demand].

[Alternatively:

Here the Crown alleges that, although the accused did not make the demand expressly, you would infer from all of the circumstances and what was [said/done] to [the alleged victim] that the accused was demanding the property from [the alleged victim]. [A direction on the care required in relation to drawing inferences should be considered: see [3-150]].]

On the other hand, the accused denies that any such demand was made, whether in express words or by inference. The accused says … [specify defence case as to demand].

2. Accompanied with menaces/by force

The second element the Crown must prove is that the demand was accompanied [with menaces/by force]. [Where appropriate: “Menaces” means a threat. Here, the Crown alleges [specify the threat/force used]].

The Crown has to prove what the accused actually said or did. When you have decided what the accused has said or done, then you must ask yourselves whether these words and/or actions amounted to [a threat/force].

This is to be determined objectively. That means, you as the jury have to decide whether a person of ordinary firmness of mind would have regarded what the accused [said/did] as [a threat/force], and would have likely been influenced so as to give in unwillingly to the demand. This is the test to apply, rather than whether the [alleged victim] themselves was or would have likely been influenced by it to act in a way contrary to [the alleged victim’s] wishes. That is what I meant by saying the matter is to be determined objectively, by your assessment of the reaction of a person of ordinary firmness of mind which may or may not have been the reaction of [the alleged victim] in this case.

The menace need not involve violence or injury and can be by the accused or any other person. [Specify how the Crown puts its case in this respect.]

It is also not necessary that [the alleged victim] actually gives way to the threat or the force, or actually hands the property over.

[Set out the respective Crown and defence cases as to the threat or force].

3. With the intention to steal

The third element the Crown must prove is that at the time the accused made the demand on [the alleged victim] for their property [as specified in indictment], they had the intention to steal it. To prove this, the Crown must satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt the accused, when they made the demand, intended to permanently deprive [the alleged victim] of this property, knowing or believing that the accused was not legally entitled to the property and that the accused acted with a dishonest state of mind.

[A suggested direction on intention is to be found at [3-210] and may be adapted to suit the circumstances of the case].

[If the accused raises a claim of right, a suggested direction is to be found at the end of [5-6105] and may be adapted to suit the circumstances of the case].

The Crown alleges … [specify the Crown case on intent to steal]. On the other hand, the accused says … [specify the defence case on intent to steal].

[5-5620] Notes

Last reviewed: September 2025
1. 

A demand may be explicit or implicit. It is for the jury to determine whether there was a demand in all the circumstances: R v Collister (1955) 39 CR App R 100 at 105; cited with approval in Delaney v R [2013] NSWCCA 150 at [22]–[25]. For a case where an implicit threat amounted to a menace (and where the prosecution case was the demand itself constituted the threat), see DPP v Curby [2000] NSWSC 745.

2. 

The demand need not be communicated directly to an intended target, but it must be made with the intention that it should be conveyed or communicated to the person to whom it is directed in circumstances which are apt to achieve that end. This is a question of fact: Austin v The Queen (1989) 166 CLR 669 at 674–675; see also discussion of Austin v The Queen in Delaney v R at [28] and in Rae v R (1998) 45 NSWLR 546 at 549–550 (in relation to a use carriage service to menace offence).

3. 

Subsection (3) was added to s 99 by the Crimes Amendment Act 2007 which also repealed ss 100–105. Section 105 had provided, “It shall be immaterial whether any such menace or threat, as is referred to in sections 99 to 103 both inclusive, is of violence, or injury, or of an accusation to be caused, or made, by the offender, of by any other person, or whether the accusation, if made, shall purport to be that of the offender, or some other person”. This was construed in DPP v Kuo (1999) 49 NSWLR 226 at [6] to broaden the scope of the “menaces” so as to include harm done by words as well as by physical force, and harm done by the words of persons other than the person accused. Given this legislative history, it is suggested that s 99(3) should be construed in the same manner. Arguably, it could also be construed as providing it is immaterial whether the threat and the threatened action is by different people. Because s 99(3) is broad and includes possibilities that may be irrelevant to the case at hand, the above suggested direction should be followed by a precise statement of what the Crown case is in the present case.

4. 

Lord Wright in Thorne v Motor Trade Association [1937] AC 797 at 817 stated: “I think the word ‘menace’ is to be construed liberally and not as limited to threats of violence but as including threats of any action detrimental or unpleasant to the person addressed. It may also include a warning that in certain events such action is intended”. The test of whether the threat is a menace is whether it is “of such a nature and extent that the mind of an ordinary person of normal stability and courage might be influenced or made apprehensive so as to accede unwillingly to the demand”: R v Clear [1968] 2 WLR 122 at 130. It is immaterial whether the menace is of violence or injury by the accused or by any other person: Crimes Act, s 99(3). Menaces are not limited to threats of actual physical harm: Rae v R at 553–555 (and the cases there cited). It also includes threats to a person’s property: DPP v Kuo at [6]; cited in Pellegrino v Harman [2016] ACTSC 366 at [140]–[141] (in relation to a use carriage service to menace offence).

5. 

For a case where claim of right was raised in a count for demanding property with menaces with intent to steal, see R v Bernhard [1938] 2 All ER 140.