Sovereign citizens: ideology, impacts and judicial responses

The Honourable Peter Johnson SC¹

Since 2020, sovereign citizen ideology and activities in Australia have grown significantly. Activities of sovereign citizens in court cause harm to the community in different ways including wasteful use of court resources, costs to litigants, wasteful use of police resources, and erosion of confidence in courts and the administration of justice. The author concentrates on the Australian experience of sovereign citizen presentations of pseudolaw, with an emphasis on Australian case law and experiences in periods before and after 2020. Pertinent issues considered include the challenge for courts to ensure a fair and efficient hearing for all parties in proceedings involving defiant sovereign citizens and the question of whether the sovereign citizen wave in Australia will reduce and ultimately subside.

Introduction²

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the label “sovereign citizen” was not particularly well known in Australia outside law enforcement agencies and, to an extent, the courts and legal profession.

Australian courts had become familiar with arguments advanced by unrepresented litigants which were described as “pseudolegal” or examples of “organised pseudolegal commercial argument” (OPCA) or asserted the existence of a “micronation”. These persons were regarded generally as difficult, if not vexatious or querulant litigants.³ They were not widely perceived to be part of a larger group now commonly described as the “sovereign citizen movement”.

Since 2020, the attention of Australian courts and lawyers has been directed to the activities of sovereign citizens and their impact on the justice system. Sessions have been held at judicial and legal conferences designed to inform and assist the justice system in managing this class of litigant.⁴

The impact of sovereign citizens has been acknowledged at the highest levels of the Australian judiciary. Justice Beech-Jones has observed that the problem of vexatious litigants for courts “was supercharged during COVID-19 by the rise of sovereign citizens”, which impacted significantly on other litigants as well.⁵ NSW Chief Justice Bell has noted that a symptom of “truth decay” may be seen in the rise of “pseudolegal” movements such as the sovereign citizen movement which has “ballooned” since the COVID-19 pandemic.⁶

The development of pseudolaw and OPCA (especially in Canada) and the sovereign citizen movement have been addressed extensively by Donald Netolitzky, whose writings have addressed the landmark (and encyclopaedic) decision of Rooke ACJ of the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta in Meads v Meads⁷ concerning sovereign citizens, pseudolaw and OPCA.⁸

The Australian experience of the sovereign citizen movement has given rise to a rapidly expanding body of literature.⁹

Dr Pitcavage has addressed the origin and growth of the sovereign citizen movement in the US and Palmer J has examined the activities of sovereign citizens in New Zealand. I had the considerable advantage of expert reports from Dr Pitcavage in a case which I decided in 2021 under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW), a decision to which I will return.¹⁰

I will concentrate on the Australian experience of pseudolaw which extends back (at least) to the late 20th century, with an emphasis on Australian case law in periods before and after 2020. There is no bright line definition of a “sovereign citizen” in Australia. I have used the term broadly in this article to include proponents of pseudolaw, OPCA and more traditional features of sovereign citizens in the US.

Later in the article, I consider pertinent issues including:

The phenomenon of multiple sovereign citizens pressing hopeless arguments which are doomed to fail and have been rejected repeatedly by courts — what can be made of this phenomenon and are there mental health issues which arise for consideration to explain it?
Past experience has involved unrepresented litigants advancing pseudolaw and OPCA arguments in civil proceedings and in summary criminal proceedings before magistrates or on conviction appeals from summary proceedings. There have been recent examples of sovereign citizens appearing for themselves in jury trials in Australia, presenting additional challenges for trial judges and the criminal justice system — how best to meet these challenges?
The management of all types of proceedings involving defiant sovereign citizen litigants — the challenge for courts to ensure a fair and efficient hearing for all parties, the provision of concise reasons and the extent to which contempt powers may arise for consideration.
Will the sovereign citizen wave in Australia reduce and ultimately subside? What can courts do to encourage this outcome?

Pseudolaw arguments in Australia up to 2020

This is not the occasion to attempt an exhaustive examination of cases where pseudolegal arguments have been advanced in Australian courts. However, brief reference will be made to some early and notorious cases before moving to more recent decisions.

Early pseudolaw arguments

In an early Australian example of the “micronation” phenomenon and the use of pseudolaw “straw man” arguments, Leonard Casley purported in the 1970s to secede from the Commonwealth of Australia and the State of Western Australia to establish the Hutt River Province. His activities were notorious and were the subject of various court decisions. In 2017, Le Miere J provided a succinct history of Casley’s activities which culminated in Casley’s “straw man” and other arguments being described by his Honour as “gobbledygook”, with it not being a “sensible or a proper use of judicial resources to recite and analyse all of the defendants’ utterances masquerading as legal submissions”.¹¹

From 1983, Alan Skyring repeatedly and unsuccessfully advanced objections in federal and Queensland courts to payment of income tax upon the basis that firstly, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) was invalid as it was enacted in contravention of Magna Carta and, secondly, the printing, issue and circulation of paper money pursuant to the Currency Act 1965 (Cth) was unlawful as that statute was not a valid law of the Commonwealth.¹² Skyring was first declared a vexatious litigant in 1992 and his litigious activities led to bankruptcy.¹³

In 2011, Skyring advised and sought unsuccessfully to speak on behalf of an appellant before the Queensland Court of Appeal. In the course of refusing leave to appeal, McMurdo P (Fraser and White JJA agreeing) said:¹⁴

It is of concern to the administration of justice that a vexatious litigant like Mr Skyring may be encouraging vulnerable people like the applicant to undertake unwinnable litigation and to pursue appeals which impose unnecessary costs on the community. It amounts to an abuse of process.

Claims insisting on trial by jury relying upon Magna Carta

In NSW between 1997 and 2020, the activities of John Wilson and his supporters generated pseudolaw arguments based upon the Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, a claimed right to trial by jury and other propositions seen later in sovereign citizen cases in Australia. Wilson had been sentenced to imprisonment for contempt of court for throwing paint at a judge in the Supreme Court with the sentence being reduced on appeal.¹⁵ Supporters of Wilson engaged in confronting behaviour in court in later proceedings and one was dealt with for contempt of court.¹⁶ Thereafter, the contemnor (Bauskis) purported to prosecute the sentencing judge for an alleged offence of denying the contemnor his right to trial by jury (said to be an offence under Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (NSW), s 43) and sought, in turn, that the judge be tried by a jury and that “by a jury sentence” the judge be subject to “imprisonment for five years”. Reliance was placed upon Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Act and the Bill of Rights which were said by Bauskis to “prescribe and guarantee a Freeman’s Right to Trial by Jury”.

An application was made to summarily dismiss the proceedings. The hearing of that application (which I heard) proceeded in a courtroom with the plaintiff, Bauskis, and about 10 supporters being matched in number by sheriff’s officers because of earlier physical interactions in and around the courthouse involving these persons. My oral judgment (dismissing the proceedings) was interrupted at times by Bauskis and his supporters, one of whom was removed from the courtroom by sheriff’s officers.¹⁷ An appeal by Bauskis was dismissed by the Court of Appeal ¹⁸ and the High Court refused special leave to appeal.¹⁹

Wilson brought a range of proceedings against different persons and entities, always asserting a right to trial by jury based on pseudolegal arguments. In 2010, Wilson was declared a vexatious litigant.²⁰

In 2011, Wilson was refused leave to bring proceedings, with Harrison J observing that the application was supported by “a series of discursive and disconnected statements about the Magna Carta, the right to trial by jury, the Constitution, Habeas Corpus, the Holy Bible, the Bill of Rights 1689 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” and “quotations from Thomas Jefferson, Halsbury’s Laws of England, Lord Edward Coke and Lysander Spooner”, none of which provided any meaningful or helpful support for the application.²¹

In 2015, it was reported that the NSW Police Force described sovereign citizens as a “potential terrorist threat” and the NSW Counter Terrorism and Special Tactics Command estimated that “there are as many as 300 sovereign citizens” in NSW.²²

In 2016, Wilson applied for leave to bring proceedings for defamation following an ABC broadcast which had identified him by way of a “domestic terror threat assessment” as an “extremist member of the sovereign citizen movement and a potential terror threat to Australia”.²³

Apart from appearing in his own cases, Wilson sought (but was refused) leave to appear as a McKenzie friend for defendants in mortgage default proceedings in support of a misconceived argument that the proceedings should be tried with a jury.²⁴

Meanwhile, in 2011, Bauskis contended unsuccessfully that he had a right to trial by jury in civil proceedings relying upon the “law of God” and Magna Carta and that “as a citizen of Australia he has an inalienable right to have the entirety of his dispute, including all procedural aspects of it, heard and determined by a jury”.²⁵

Nine years later, in 2020, the Court of Appeal relied upon Meads v Meads²⁶ and a decision of Black J²⁷ in refusing Bauskis leave to appeal where he had contended, on OPCA and pseudolaw grounds, that he was entitled to trial by jury.²⁸ The arguments advanced by Bauskis in 2007 in his attempt to prosecute a Supreme Court judge were clearly identifiable as pseudolegal contentions, as seen in Meads v Meads and later sovereign citizen cases.

Misconceived attempts to rely upon Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights in support of trial by jury for summary offences had been firmly and repeatedly rejected, including by the High Court in 2000 where McHugh J said that the application was legally and constitutionally without merit and continued:²⁹

Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights are not documents binding on Australian legislatures in the way the Constitution is binding on them. Any legislature acting within the powers allotted to it by the Constitution can legislate in disregard of Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights. At the highest, those two documents express a political ideal, but they do not legally bind the legislatures of this country or, for that matter, the United Kingdom. Nor do they limit the powers of the legislatures of Australia or the United Kingdom.

This approach reflects the clear position of Australian courts and no coherent argument to the contrary has ever been advanced.³⁰ Despite this, arguments based on Magna Carta have been a cornerstone in cases based on pseudolaw reasoning.³¹

Reasoning based upon Magna Carta and other pseudolegal concepts had been demolished comprehensively in 2005 by Barrett J, with his Honour adopting the words of Young CJ in Eq³² that the submissions involved “pseudo technical legal rubbish” and that “there [was] a strong element of perversity” in the litigant persisting with them.³³

Courts had likewise rejected emphatically purported claims or defences in civil proceedings based upon Credit River decisions³⁴ and OPCA arguments.³⁵

State of NSW v Hardy — proceedings under Terrorism (High Risk Offenders Act) 2017

Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the increasing attraction of the sovereign citizen movement in Australia was illustrated by the activities of Christopher Hardy who, in 2017–2018, sent a letter threatening death or grievous bodily harm to a member of NSW Parliament. Inside the envelope were various documents accusing the Commonwealth of being a corporation controlled by foreign corporations, a view aligned with the sovereign citizen movement. Located at Hardy’s property were prohibited weapons and blueprints for the manufacture of plastic firearms together with printed materials containing anti-government sentiments. Hardy swore an affidavit for a Supreme Court bail application (where bail was revoked) and his affidavit bore telltale signs of the sovereign citizen movement. Following the completion of sentences of imprisonment, Hardy was subject to an extended supervision order under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) for two years from April 2019.³⁶

In the 2021 proceedings, in which a further extended supervision order was made, Dr Pitcavage explained features of Hardy’s activities which confirmed Hardy’s strong support for sovereign citizen ideology. These passages from the reports of Dr Pitcavage (contained in the following extract from the judgment) also serve the purpose of describing unusual features or practices of sovereign citizens, some of which appear in Australian court decisions involving sovereign citizens:³⁷

Dr Pitcavage explained some features of the Defendant’s conduct which indicated his association with SCM ideology (Exhibit B, page 497):

… it is very common for sovereign citizens to spell their names with punctuation within their names. Sovereign citizens often claim they do this to separate their “Christian appellation” from their government-given or tribal/clan names, although sometimes they have other explanations. Using the most common such style, a sovereign citizen whose name is Lisa Elizabeth Masterson might write her name as Lisa-Elizabeth: Masterson, putting a dash between her first and middle names and a colon, semi-colon or comma between her middle and last names. Mr Hardy has used this form of his name on his Linkedin social media profile, in two different versions: 1) Christopher-Bruce: Ingham-Hardy and 2) Christopher-Bruce-Ingham-Hardy. In addition, Mr Hardy frequently puts a copyright mark next to his name, which is also a sovereign citizen indicator. In 2001, many sovereign gurus began claiming that one could copyright their own name, after which any unauthorized use of their name by anybody could make that person or entity subject to fines or judgments.

Dr Pitcavage explained the concept of “redemption theory” and stated that, from the documents and manuals downloaded by the Defendant in his Internet searches, the Defendant “has evinced a particular interest in redemption theory and its application to Australia and himself” and observed that the Defendant “also seems to have had at least a passing interest in survivalism as many right-wing extremists do” (Exhibit B, page 499).

In a further report dated 5 February 2021 (Exhibit A, pages 283-306), Dr Pitcavage addressed specific topics. With respect to the Defendant’s affidavit bearing red ink fingerprints with the Defendant’s signature ... Dr Pitcavage said (Exhibit A, page 286):

Regardless of the country in which they appear, sovereign citizen ideology is centered around the notion that an earlier or original version of the government of that country was infiltrated and subverted by a longstanding conspiracy, and turned into an illegitimate and tyrannical government. However, by taking certain steps or filing certain papers, knowledgeable individuals can in essence divorce themselves from the illegitimate, de facto government, after which it has no authority or jurisdiction over them, and they can ignore its laws, regulations, taxes, and so forth.

By way of further explanation for this practice, Dr Pitcavage stated (Exhibit A, page 287):

Sovereign-related thumbprints usually appear over an actual signature, but can sometimes appear next to them, or in a location specified by a form or document; as with most things related to the sovereign citizen movement, no practice is entirely universal. Some sovereign citizen gurus teach that signatures should not only be accompanied by a thumbprint but also by a postage stamp.

Most sovereign citizen leaders tell their followers that the thumbprints should be in ink of a specific color. The majority of such leaders promote red as the color to use, although there are sovereign citizens who insist that blue ink, or some other color of ink, is proper. Some sovereign citizens will actually use blood rather than red ink for thumbprints on documents.

…

Finally, Dr Pitcavage referred to a further feature of the Defendant’s affidavit which had the hallmarks of SCM adherence (Exhibit A, page 289):

Finally, page 94 of the affidavit reproduces another e-mail apparently sent by Mr. Hardy. This e-mail contains several legal phrases that sovereign citizens frequently use in inappropriate contexts, including “an unrebutted affidavit is truth in law” and “all law is based in truth.” It also contains a mailing address in which the digits of the postcard do not appear in numeric form but are written out: two two nine oh. Sovereign citizens have conspiracy theories about postal/zip codes that frequently cause them to render such code in unorthodox or unusual ways, or to omit them entirely. They also have similar tics about other elements of mailing addresses, including sometimes writing out numbers as words …

Proceedings since 2020 — ballooning sovereign citizens arguments

By 2020, courts had rejected repeated pseudolaw arguments which thereafter multiplied in proceedings “supercharged” by the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic.

This overview of cases and other developments between 2020 and 2024 reveals substantial, entrenched, multi-faceted and doomed reliance on pseudolaw and sovereign citizen ideology in Australia.

In a 2023 table summarising pseudolaw groups and movements worldwide, Netolitzky described the Australian position as follows:³⁸

Political and social orientation	Racial orientation	Additional key characteristics	Status
Politically diverse, Libertarian, anti-authority	Diverse, some xenophobic, some Indigenous separatist	No dominant Australia-specific pseudolaw style, influenced by Canada, US, UK	Active, probably expanding

Impact of COVID-19 pandemic

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the growth of the sovereign citizen movement in Australia has been noted by informed Australian commentators. Dr Campion observed in 2022 that grievances associated with COVID-19 and anti-authority ideology had contributed to an increase in issue-motivated extremism:³⁹

The COVID-19 pandemic especially has stirred these particular subcultures. With rising opposition to COVID-19 countermeasures, they have entangled themselves with ideological strangers, such as anti-vaxxers and conspiracists like QAnon. Some, such as the sovereign citizen movement, have expanded their reach and recruited markedly, while others remained small and kept a low profile. Large or small, the groups that abide by such divisive and dangerous ideologies remain a threat to the Australian community and its citizens.

Lydia Khalil noted in 2022 that, during the pandemic, the sovereign citizen movement intersected with the anti-lockdown and anti-vax movements and also “attracted and interacted with a number of far right and extremist elements that sought to find common cause and recruited among the sovereign citizen, anti-vax and anti-lockdown cohort”.⁴⁰

The Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) has undertaken informative research, including interviews with a sample of individuals who protested to public health measures during the pandemic. This research indicated, on the part of some persons, endorsement of conspiratorial views and sovereign citizen ideology.⁴¹

Concern has also been raised about the risk of violence being used by sovereign citizens.⁴²

The curial front line — Local Courts and Magistrates Courts

It has been the Local Court of NSW and magistrates courts in other Australian jurisdictions that have borne the initial brunt of increased sovereign citizen activity in the courts.⁴³ Of course, it is interactions with police which lead to summary prosecutions (commonly for traffic offences) where the person regularly seeks to challenge the authority of police on sovereign citizen grounds. The experience has been that police deal reasonably and patiently in traffic interactions with sovereign citizens with events usually being recorded by body-worn cameras.

To support the courts (in particular the Local Court), the Judicial Commission of NSW (in conjunction with the Local Court of NSW) has developed and made available to NSW magistrates a document designed to give practical assistance to courts in considering sovereign citizen arguments.⁴⁴

Proceedings for summary traffic offences

Proceedings for summary traffic offences have attracted a range of bizarre sovereign citizen type pseudolegal arguments. These include challenges to the jurisdiction of the court and a contention that “driving” is to be contrasted with “travelling”, so that “driving” only applies if the vehicle is being used for commerce or pursuant to a contract or employment. These submissions are often accompanied by “living man” arguments and other obscure contentions.

The inevitable outcome is rejection of spurious arguments and confirmation of the initial penalty with increased financial costs arising from costs orders made at first instance and on appeal. The emphatic rejection of these arguments in published cases has not served to stem the flow of litigants advancing the same nonsensical arguments.⁴⁵

Justice Livesey spoke directly in rejecting such an appeal in South Australia in 2020, describing the fate of other cases based on pseudolegal arguments:⁴⁶

They have without reservation been rejected as involving both legal nonsense and an unnecessary waste of scarce public and judicial resources. So too here.

…

It is regrettable that the appellant has advocated the various pseudolegal arguments underpinning this appeal. If he has acted on the advice of others, he is well advised to stop doing so. His decision to defend has resulted in a trivial parking fine escalating to a financial burden exceeding $2,000.

A variety of civil proceedings

Pseudolegal and OPCA arguments have been relied on in a range of civil proceedings, including “living man” and contract contentions and challenges to the jurisdiction of the court.⁴⁷

In a 2024 Victorian decision granting an application for removal of a caveat placed on property on spurious pseudolegal grounds, Gobbo AsJ rejected these arguments in trenchant terms and chronicled helpfully the trend discernible in other court decisions:⁴⁸

The Courts have, particularly over recent years, seen an increase in the number of these types of arguments stemming from a fanciful legal universe that seems to have proliferated largely online.

Examples include:

(a)

newly created credit and book entries, promissory notes, assignment of a reversionary interest in one’s birth certificate, the “Living Man”, the “Straw Man”, the capitalisation of a person’s name alleged to constitute a “corporation trust” and acceptance for value in Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited v Grahame [2020] VSC 86;

(b)

an authenticated birth certificate as a security in Aidan Llewellyn trading as the Trustee for the House of Llewellyn v State of New South Wales [2023] NSWSC 1250;

(c)

the “Living Man” and the capitalisation of a person’s name alleged to constitute a “corporation trust” in Yap v Matic [2022] WASC 181;

(d)

the “Living Man” in Stefan v McLachlan [2023] VSC 501, Re Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2022] VSC 438, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bonaccorso (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 766, Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bonaccorso (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 1018, and Palmer v No Respondent [2023] VSCA 322;

(e)

the “Living Man”, “wet ink contracts” and the Supreme Court being an alleged “fiction” in Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Moir [2024] WASC 319;

(f)

Turnbull v Clarence Valley Council [2023] NSWSC 83, where the Court considered:

(i)

alleged international frauds and conspiracies (including one from the 1960s and involving secret IMF banking policies to control the global financial system and all governments under a world government and another allegedly pursued by Australian prime ministers, to remove the people from the Commonwealth of Australia);

(ii)

the “Living Man” including assertions of universal sovereignty, deficiencies in birth registration, personage flowing from the Creator, and claimed violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and

(iii)

a notice issued to Council by the Velvet Revolution, which the plaintiff claimed evidenced service of a moratorium on all Local Council members, charging them with misprision of treason, which rested on the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), UK legislation, the Nuremburg Code, Helsinki Code and Magna Carta, as well as claimed inalienable rights;

(g)

sovereign citizens generally in Bradley v The Crown [2020] QCA 252, and State of New South Wales v Hardy (Final) [2021] NSWSC 900;

(h)

the “Straw Man” in Kelly v Fiander [2023] WASC 187; and

(i)

secession and the “Straw Man” in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Casley [2017] WASC 161.

Like many of the previous iterations by sovereign citizens that have been comprehensively rejected before, the first defendant’s arguments before me concerning the “Living Man” and “the People’s Court of Terra Australis” were nothing more than carnival of absurdity drawn from a mishmash of delusional arguments. Whilst it may be tempting to simply dismiss these claims as nonsense, gibberish, gobbledegook or like, in doing so that should not diminish from the serious impact these delusional arguments can have on the authority of the Court.

The above list in Nelson v Greenman summarises usefully the types of sovereign citizen arguments which have been advanced in recent years and have attracted universal rejection and condemnation by courts throughout Australia. In the course of granting summary judgment for possession of mortgaged property in a 2024 Western Australian decision, Lundberg J rejected succinctly pseudolegal arguments relied upon to resist the claim:⁴⁹

Having reviewed this material, it is unnecessary to recite the extensive pseudo-legal journey that Ms Kounis invites the Court to follow, commencing with the Laws of God, then to the Magna Carta of 1215, the first five books of the King James Bible of 1611, various English statutes from the 17th and 18th centuries, isolated quotes from Blackstone’s Commentaries, a review of the constitutionality of income tax laws in this country, and several High Court authorities, all taken out of context. This material is irrelevant to the disposition by this Court of the present action and the pending applications and I will put it to one side, unless it requires an express mention.

Custody proceedings and other protective orders

Pseudolaw and sovereign citizen arguments have been advanced, disturbingly, in custody proceedings before the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia.⁵⁰ Where a parent advances pseudolegal arguments in custody proceedings, the court faces additional challenges. The best interests of the child is the paramount consideration. The court must focus on that issue without being deflected by pseudolegal jurisdictional and other arguments. Recent decisions reflect the court dealing carefully with the issues falling for decision while addressing sufficiently pseudolegal arguments.⁵¹

A feature in these custody proceedings is the assertion of “ownership” of the child as property.⁵² In the course of dismissing an appeal in Pitter and Baier (No 2), Reithmuller J observed:⁵³

… the appellant argued that as the children were created with his DNA, he is able to claim them as his property. No person has property rights over another person in Australia.

In Planck and Planck, Reithmuller J dismissed with costs an appeal by a father who asserted a right to trial by jury and asserted a range of jurisdictional challenges based on sovereign citizen beliefs.⁵⁴

Sovereign citizen arguments have also been firmly rejected in cases of refusal of a working with children certificate⁵⁵ and in an unsuccessful appeal against the making of a domestic violence protection order.⁵⁶

Prosecution for serious indictable crimes

Pseudolaw and sovereign citizen arguments have also arisen in prosecutions for serious crimes prosecuted on indictment. A jurisdictional challenge on sovereign citizen grounds to an indictment charging unlawful production of cannabis was rejected in R v Sweet.⁵⁷ In a judgment cited in later decisions and papers concerning sovereign citizens, Judge Cash KC demolished the “straw man” argument, relying upon Meads v Meads⁵⁸ and other decisions. His Honour concluded:⁵⁹

There is no room for doubt or confusion as to who is said to have done the criminal acts and who is to stand trial in relation to the allegations. That is the applicant. His apparent wish to be identified by a name that is different to the name he was assigned at birth is of no moment at all. However he is known, and no matter how odd the punctuation, he remains the same person — the one alleged to have committed the offences charged in the indictment.

While the so called “straw man” argument may properly be described as nonsense or gobbledygook, it is in any event of no assistance to the applicant in present circumstances. It is to my mind clear that under the criminal law of Queensland the applicant’s claim to possess or be associated with some separate legal entity is entirely irrelevant.

The challenges for a trial judge, where a defiant unrepresented sovereign citizen stood trial before a jury, were on full display in R v Kirsten (a pseudonym).⁶⁰ The accused stood trial in the Wollongong District Court for unlawful removal of a child (her eight-year-old daughter) contrary to Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 87. The trial judge was Judge Haesler SC, a very senior and respected judge with a wealth of experience in the criminal law. His Honour’s 2024 judgment chronicled the rulings made during the trial. The judgment recounts the five-day trial in which the accused consistently talked over the judge and ignored rulings. His Honour said that he was initially concerned about the accused’s fitness to be tried but formed the view that the accused’s disobedience was wilful.⁶¹ In her closing address to the jury, the accused said that it was “all a performance”.⁶² The accused was found guilty by the jury and was remanded in custody for sentence. His Honour dealt with the accused for contempt in the face of the court and explained his reasoning for this in some detail.⁶³

His Honour concluded the judgment:⁶⁴

When she addressed the jury at the close of the evidence Kirsten said:

“... perhaps the jury will realise that there has been a change of tone here ... This has been all a performance ... I admit that I was cheeky as part of the performance because I felt like you guys in your part of your performance were being cheeky to me, and I wanted the jury to see that it truly is a performance.”: Tcpt, 9 August 2024 (Accused’s Address), p 5.

Kirsten chose to represent herself. Kirsten chose not to seek advice from lawyers or any guidance from me about her conduct of her trial. She chose not to listen. She chose to obstruct the trial. She chose to proceed on the basis that the laws of New South Wales did not apply to her. She chose to be rude and offensive to the prosecution, witnesses, the judge and the jury. She did so in the presence of her jury. She was fit to be tried. Her actions were deliberate and considered. She was, in all respects, “the maker of her own misfortune”: Craig v South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at [184].

The judgment in R v Kirsten makes sobering reading. It illustrates the criminal justice system under great stress because the accused person, in a jury trial, apparently set out to defy the court and reject the authority of the trial judge. In my view, his Honour rose to the extraordinary challenge posed by the accused’s approach and ensured that a trial according to law took place. I return to this case later in the article.

In Tasmania, Daniel Victor Gandini (who preferred to be known as “Diplomat Dan”) stood trial in the Supreme Court in 2024, before Blow CJ and a jury, upon two counts of assault and four counts of committing an unlawful act intended to cause bodily harm. The accused, who professed sovereign citizen beliefs, appeared for himself. He was found guilty by the jury and was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment for three years and six months with a non-parole period of 21 months. He appealed against conviction. The appeal was dismissed.⁶⁵

The offences involved a standoff between the accused and police officers leading to the accused throwing a container of corrosive liquid at police officers who were wearing protective clothing and holding ballistic shields.

The accused appeared for himself on appeal. The Court (Estcourt and Jago JJ, Martin AJ) referred to the applicant’s arguments on appeal:⁶⁶

As can be seen, the two notices of appeal contain grounds ranging from a lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Court, errors of law on the part of the trial judge, jury misconduct and a conspiracy between the judge and the jury and counsel for the State. In addition, on the hearing of the appeal, the Court permitted the applicant to raise arguments about lack of evidence and fabrication of evidence by the appellant’s wife and his psychologist and by police officers and about factual inconsistencies in the evidence, all of which would ordinarily be regarded as arguments that the verdicts were unsafe and unsatisfactory.

The Court also allowed the appellant to raise an asserted error of law on the part of the trial judge in directing the jury that police had the power to enter the premises where the appellant was, search for him there, and arrest him, pursuant to ss 10(7) and 11 of the Family Violence Act 2004.

A reading of the almost 1,000 pages of the transcript of the trial satisfied the Court that the trial judge did not err in law or in the factual basis for his rulings made during the course of the trial, nor in his summing up or the memorandum that he provided the jury.

The Court rejected the grounds of appeal and observed that the “clearly admissible evidence of guilt against the accused was completely overwhelming”.⁶⁷

Sentencing decisions have been made for serious offences committed by sovereign citizens. In R v Ryan,⁶⁸ a 60-year-old Aboriginal man, who espoused sovereign citizen beliefs, engaged in a 12-hour siege with police in the course of which the offender discharged a firearm with intent to resist arrest. He was sentenced for a range of offences including firearms offences. The sentencing judge noted that the offender had identified as a sovereign citizen since 2020. In sentencing the offender to an aggregate term of imprisonment for six years and six months with a non-parole period of three years and three months, Judge Noman SC noted that the offender “recognised the right of the Court to sentence” and continued:⁶⁹

General deterrence is of significance when sentencing for any firearm offence and more so one involving a weapon being discharged. Of even greater significance is when the offence involves that firearm being discharged at a member of the Police Service.

The offender still maintains his sovereign beliefs. I accept the submission advanced on his behalf that it is non-mainstream but not akin to a terrorist organisation. It is however a belief system that caused issues for the offender in his interaction with others and endorsed irrational thoughts. The offender has not demonstrated remorse or real insight into his offending and what precipitated it. I consider personal deterrence has a continuing role to play.

The offences in R v Ryan and Diplomat Dan v State of Tasmania⁷⁰ are examples of confrontations between sovereign citizens and police in a siege setting. This is a particularly troubling scenario arising from strong anti-authority and anti-police views on the part of some sovereign citizens. Fortunately, Australia has not experienced the level of anti-police violence as has occurred in the US and is described by Dr Pitcavage.⁷¹

Other proceedings under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW)

As mentioned earlier, extended supervision orders were made in 2019 and 2021 under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 in the case of a sovereign citizen in State of NSW v Hardy.⁷² Appropriately, that statute contains demanding requirements before a continuing detention order or extended supervision order can be made. There have been cases of persons espousing sovereign citizen beliefs where the court has not been satisfied that the requirement for an order had been established and an order was declined.⁷³

Mixing sovereign citizen rhetoric and First Nations sovereignty

There have been examples of sovereign citizen style pseudolegal arguments being mixed with First Nations sovereignty claims in Australia. When First Nations sovereignty issues are infected with sovereign citizen pseudolegal arguments, the seriousness of First Nations claims will be diminished.⁷⁴

Concerns about the mixing of sovereign citizen rhetoric with First Nations sovereignty involved in claims under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) were expressed in a 2023 anthropological paper.⁷⁵ In a helpful analysis, the authors traced the history of the sovereign citizen movement and the emergence of a group called the Original Sovereign Tribunal Federation (OSTF) which, in December 2021, established a presence close to the Aboriginal Tent Embassy near Old Parliament House in Canberra with resulting friction with existing Tent Embassy activists. On 30 December 2021, people with ties to OSTF set fire to the doors of Old Parliament House. In 2022, OSTF posted disinformation on social media about native title and promoted a variety of conspiracy theories including anti-government sentiment and hate speech.

The authors stated:⁷⁶

The emergence of a small minority of individuals in Australia who hold problematic sovereign citizen superconspiracy beliefs has the potential to impact the current and future work of practitioners involved in native title claims. Taplin, a native title anthropologist, observed several claimants withdraw their participation from native title anthropological research in 2022, and attended meetings in which sovereign citizen rhetoric was advanced aggressively and disrupted the decision-making process of native title claim groups. Setting aside arguments as to the efficacy or legitimacy of the native title process, the authors contend that native title claimants are entitled to make decisions in relation to native title processes on the basis of accurate information, and that native title practitioners have a professional obligation to counter disinformation where it disrupts informed decision-making (including dis-information inspired by sovereign citizen rhetoric).

Arguments have been advanced in criminal cases where objection was taken unsuccessfully to the jurisdiction of the court to try an Aboriginal person upon the basis that the laws did not apply to the person as a “sovereign tribal man”⁷⁷ or it was sought that the Aboriginal accused be tried by a special court to be called the “Aboriginal Genocide Court”.⁷⁸

Taxation issues

It has been reported that absurd tax advice has been given, based on sovereign citizen ideology, including an assertion that the payment of tax is voluntary.⁷⁹ In a 2023 judgment, Beach JA refused leave to appeal in a case where reliance was placed on pseudolegal arguments in an effort to defeat liability for more than $2 million of unpaid income tax.⁸⁰ Reference was made earlier in this article to the spurious arguments of Alan Skyring, advanced over several decades, in an effort to avoid payment of income tax.

Consideration of some issues concerning the sovereign citizen phenomenon

Sovereign citizens and repeated reliance upon doomed arguments

Multiple sovereign citizen litigants have advanced hopeless arguments that are doomed to fail, undeterred by the regular rejection of these arguments by courts. These litigants proceed like proverbial lemmings, one after the other, to jump over a curial cliff with substantial financial and costs consequences. Why is this happening?

The Honourable P Quinlan, Chief Justice of Western Australia addressed the fixed views of sovereign citizens:⁸¹

We see this in the phenomenon of the sovereign citizen movement, in which our fellow citizens deny the entire legitimacy of our legal system, based on a mixture of social and political philosophy and pseudo-law, which commonly draws on historical legal authorities such as the Magna Carta. All of it is, of course, wholly misguided. Nevertheless it is striking how sincerely and ardently held such beliefs seem to be and how impervious to reason they are; and, how the sovereign citizen takes it as axiomatic that his or her judgment sits on an equal footing with that of the court and, as a result of their sovereign status, should prevail.

Significantly, and in something of a paradox, the sovereign citizen almost always has a fervent belief in the importance of the “rule of law” as they see it. Indeed, the sovereign citizen is deeply committed to the rule of law. It is simply that the “law” for them happens to be the idiosyncratic subjective opinions that they hold (or have absorbed from social media).

But again, it is a mistake to think of sovereign citizens as simply bizarre outliers wholly unconnected to our legal system as a whole. They are, I want to suggest, simply the extreme end of a continuum that tacitly regards any decision of a court applying the law as merely one opinion among many.

As the Chief Justice observes, the sovereign citizen is certain of the correctness of their own position, irrespective of the ruling by a judge. The strong attachment by many pseudolaw proponents to trial by jury is related to this. There is a clear view on the part of sovereign citizens that judges get it wrong in their cases; however, if a jury determined their case the sovereign citizen would succeed. This approach, of course, rejects the authority of judges and serves to undermine confidence in the administration of justice.⁸²

The widespread repetition before courts of clearly doomed arguments also raises a question concerning the role (if any) of mental health issues on the part of the proponents of these arguments.

This issue has been considered in Canada and the US (between 2013 and 2018), where it was noted that sovereign citizens may present with features that appear psychotic in nature, including bizarre and paranoid beliefs, as well as unusual speech and behaviour which may be mistaken for psychotic symptomatology. The consistent conclusion in psychiatric studies of criminal cases was that the majority of these persons will be neither psychotic nor unfit to stand trial — their beliefs may appear delusional in nature but are shared within and sanctioned by a large group.⁸³

In Meads v Meads, Rooke ACJ said:⁸⁴

This Court has observed that some OPCA litigants appear to suffer from cognitive or psychological disorders, however one should not presume those conditions from the presence of OPCA arguments and concepts. Similarly, bizarre in-court conduct does not necessarily mean these persons suffer from that kind of disorder. Anomalous behaviour may instead reflect the “rules” of an OPCA strategy and script.

Netolitzky referred to the American and Canadian psychiatric studies (noted in footnote 82) in a 2019 article:⁸⁵

The Meads OPCA indicia serve another useful role not suggested in that decision. Psychiatric investigation of Freemen and Sovereign Citizens has concluded adherence to pseudolaw conspiracies is an expression of extreme political beliefs, reinforced in small introspective social communities. However, the peculiar formulaic expression of these ideas mimics delusion. That has resulted in misdiagnosis of these persons as mentally ill. OPCA ideas such as the “Strawman” duality have been misidentified as a mental health issue, rather than pseudolaw. Court-ordered psychiatric examinations and detentions may result. The Meads OPCA indicia are therefore a helpful resource to distinguish between persons who litigate because of mental illness versus anti-government ideology expressed in an unorthodox manner.

Professor Pathé, Forensic Psychiatrist, Swinburne University of Technology, Victoria, has observed that garbled statements and eccentric theories of sovereign citizens may suggest mental illness (disorganisation, delusional thinking) such as schizophrenia. However, Professor Pathé noted that a large number of adherents share the beliefs, and that they are not strictly delusional. Professor Pathé expressed the opinion that they represent “extreme overvalued beliefs” held with strong conviction which are not delusions.⁸⁶

It will be recalled that Judge Haesler SC formed the view that the accused in R v Kirsten was fit to be tried in the difficult trial at which his Honour presided in August 2024.⁸⁷

John Wilson had been diagnosed with obsessive compulsive personality disorder, a factor which contributed to the reduction of his sentence for contempt of court by the Court of Appeal.⁸⁸

Clearly, medical examination of particular persons espousing sovereign citizen ideology may reveal issues concerning fitness to be tried and/or mental illness. However, there appears to be no proper foundation for the view that the bizarre and repeated arguments advanced by these persons as a class raise an issue as to fitness to be tried or the presence of a mental illness.

Sovereign citizens representing themselves in jury trials

Nearly all proceedings in which sovereign citizens appear for themselves in Australia have been civil or summary criminal proceedings (or appeals) before a magistrate or judge.

The wide availability of legal aid in Australia for indictable criminal proceedings means that representation will likely be available for a sovereign citizen facing trial or sentencing proceedings for serious crime. The offender in R v Ryan⁸⁹ was legally represented on sentence.

However, particular challenges arise where a sovereign citizen chooses to be unrepresented before a jury in a criminal trial and is determined to defy the authority of the court and otherwise obstruct the proceedings. Reference has been made earlier to R v Kirsten⁹⁰ and Diplomat Dan v State of Tasmania.⁹¹

In NSW, an order for a judge alone trial cannot ordinarily be made without the consent of the accused.⁹² The only exception to this rule is where the court is of the opinion that there is a substantial risk that acts that may constitute a public justice offence are likely to be committed in respect of any jury or juror and the risk of those acts occurring may not reasonably be mitigated by other means.⁹³

In these circumstances, the trial judge in R v Kirsten was bound to proceed with a trial by jury. An overview of the unprecedented challenges posed for the trial judge and the jury by the defiant conduct of the accused in R v Kirsten appears in an early part of the judgment.⁹⁴

The trial judge sought to utilise all available procedural measures to keep the trial on foot and to provide a fair trial for the accused, the Crown and the community. His Honour considered that the accused was deliberately trying to undermine the trial process to secure a discharge of the jury although the accused apparently made no such application during the trial. A reading of the judgment explains why his Honour formed this view.

The point was reached where the contempt power was exercised with the accused (who was on bail) being taken into custody and with the balance of the trial proceeding with the accused appearing by audio-visual link from the cells.

The trial judge sentenced the accused to imprisonment for contempt of court until the rising of the court. His Honour explained why this approach was taken on sentence for contempt:⁹⁵

Further punishment would not have any value as specific deterrence for someone determined to become a martyr for a cause.

General deterrence is important in any sentencing exercise but in circumstances such as this, where a person asserts a claim which has no basis in law and has by their actions done their own case immeasurable harm, the courts can treat even deliberate and persistent contempts with leniency.

Maintaining the dignity of the Court and, even more importantly, enabling the proceedings to continue to verdict required drastic action. There had been significant disturbances and interruptions. But an accused should not be allowed to benefit from that action by forcing a discharge of the jury or otherwise delay the hearing of the serious allegations. Nor should an accused dictate proceedings by creating circumstances that might lead to a miscarriage of justice, create an appeal point because of a denial of procedural fairness or otherwise force a new trial.

The purpose of that drastic action was to ensure that the disturbance stopped at a point where no claim could be made that the action prevented a fair trial or the presentation of a defence case. I was able to stop the disturbance despite her persisting in disrupting proceedings by her detention.

In such peculiar circumstances and the purpose of the contempt proceedings having been achieved I did not believe that any further penalty for the contempt other than her detention was required. Ms [Deleted] did not purge her contempt, she is not likely to, but no more Court time should be spent on this matter.

I determined that the only further punishment required was that she be sentenced to the rising of the court. Soon after the Court rose.

It can be seen that the trial judge used the contempt power to exercise a level of control over the defiant accused to ensure that the trial could continue. His Honour gave directions to the jury throughout the trial in compliance with the obligation to ensure a fair trial took place.

The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in Diplomat Dan v State of Tasmania⁹⁶ also reflects some of the challenges posed for the trial judge in that case, although they were nowhere near the aggressive and defiant approach of the accused seen in R v Kirsten. The use of the contempt power did not arise in the Tasmanian case.⁹⁷

As noted earlier, I commend the approach of the trial judge in R v Kirsten. It will, of course, be a matter for the Court of Criminal Appeal to determine any appeal brought in this most challenging case.

In Canada, an accused sovereign citizen was sentenced to imprisonment for 12 months for his defiant conduct during the proceedings.⁹⁸ An appeal against conviction was allowed on procedural fairness grounds.⁹⁹

Management of sovereign citizen proceedings generally

It is the obligation of courts to determine civil and criminal proceedings fairly, efficiently, courteously, and according to law.

Sovereign citizen arguments are now well known and have been rejected by courts throughout Australia with reasons for those rulings being provided in varying degrees of detail. The obligation to give reasons may be satisfied concisely. The duty to give reasons does not require the judge to spell out every step in the reasoning process or refer to every piece of evidence. It is sufficient if the reasons adequately reveal the basis of the decision, expressing specific findings that are critical to the determination of proceedings.¹⁰⁰

In my view, the approach adopted by Livesey J¹⁰¹ or Lundberg J,¹⁰² both referred to above, would more than satisfy these requirements where hopeless sovereign citizen submissions have been made.

A number of cases refer to the 2013 judgment of McKechnie J where his Honour said:¹⁰³

Finally, judges administer justice according to law. They are not required to expend judicial time, a scarce public resource, on applications that have no legal foundation and involve deluded understanding of the law.

After referring to these observations of McKechnie J and those of Livesey J, Button J noted in a 2024 decision that the court’s resources are finite and that “other litigants are also vexed by having to expend time and resources on such claims” and that the legislature has equipped courts “with power to avoid the waste of those resources by unmeritorious claims (and defences).”¹⁰⁴

In New Zealand, Ellis J observed in Niwa v Commissioner of Inland Revenue that, at a general level, it will inevitably be an abuse of process “for a litigant to attempt to employ OPCA concepts in seeking to avoid or defeat any state, regulatory, contract, family or other obligations recognised by law” and, specifically, that it is an abuse of process to employ such concepts in an attempt to avoid tax liability.¹⁰⁵

This approach has been applied in later New Zealand cases where reliance upon OPCA arguments has been said to be “untenable”.¹⁰⁶ This formula allows for brief reasons to be given for rejecting the submissions.

Hobbs, Young and McIntyre have suggested that a fuller approach might be adopted by courts in explaining the rejection of pseudolaw arguments:¹⁰⁷

Given the fact that many adherents hold sincere but misinformed beliefs, courts should respond carefully when dealing with such litigants. Responses should be guided by a more structured form of engagement, instead of the mockery and minimalisation that may initially seem justified.

The authors then acknowledged that there “are strong reasons for courts to quickly dismiss pseudo-legal submissions” but that “research suggests that there is value in providing a thorough and explicit rejection of these sorts of arguments”.¹⁰⁸ The appropriate response for a court will depend upon the circumstances of the case.

Where a sovereign citizen litigant is defiant and the proceedings are effectively obstructed, an order for removal of the person from court may be used in an appropriate case with an indication that the litigant will be allowed to return to court if he or she is prepared to behave appropriately and comply with directions of the court. An order for removal will usually add heat to the situation and should be used selectively in an appropriate case.

The contempt power should be used sparingly and effectively as a last resort.¹⁰⁹ Judge Haesler SC used the contempt power in R v Kirsten¹¹⁰ in circumstances where there was no real alternative to maintain and protect the administration of justice in a criminal jury trial.

A sovereign citizen has been dealt with for contempt of court arising from the person’s breach of court orders and contempt in the face of the court in WA civil proceedings.¹¹¹ Justice Solomon noted that the person’s conduct which constituted contempt “appears to have been undertaken out of a sense of self-righteous anger in which disregard of the court was a collateral consequence”.¹¹² Justice Solomon referred to comments of the contemnor which reflected “somewhat incoherent or at least unorthodox views about establishing the identity of certain people” and said:¹¹³

For present purposes, the mischief in the comments with which I am concerned relates not to whether these views are correct or sensible, but rather to the acceptance or rejection of the court’s authority.

It appears that to one extent or another, the views expressed by the defendant are shared by a growing group within society that has loosely been referred to as the sovereign citizen movement and perhaps by other names or descriptions. There are aspects of the views of that movement that have come before this and other courts, including some of the views expressed by this defendant, which reflect a rejection to one degree or another of the court’s authority. Those views, and their apparent increasing popularity, or acceptance, cannot be dismissed as harmless or bemusing nonsense. The promulgation of such views and beliefs represents a dangerous corrosion of some of our society’s most fundamental values in the maintenance of the rule of law and the administration of justice. The events in the United States of America over recent years reinforce the vigilance required to protect those values and the danger inherent in taking them for granted.

But at the same time, I am not persuaded, and certainly not beyond reasonable doubt, that it is the holding of such views which inspired Mr Matic to engage in the particular conduct that I have found amounted to the contempt of which he was convicted on 27 October 2022.

In a subsequent decision where the contemnor was sentenced to imprisonment for 21 days, Solomon J emphasised the importance of protection of the administration of justice:¹¹⁴

Conduct which the court considers unusual, irritating, rude or even belligerent does not necessarily invoke the summary powers of the court. A party may express beliefs about the legitimacy of a court order, or the quality of a judgment, or may resist particular principles of law. It is not enough that the court is insulted, or that the beliefs expressed do not align with those of the judicial officer. The threshold requirement is that the court must find that the conduct interferes with the administration of justice or in some way demonstrates a contumelious disrespect for the authority of the court.

In matters such as this it is particularly important to emphasise that the court does not impose punitive measures in relation to people’s beliefs. Mr Matic is quite entitled to his beliefs even if they are irrational, irritating or even offensive to others. In a tolerant and humane society people must be entitled to hold such beliefs without fear of sanction or punishment from the State. History is littered with the tragic consequences of intolerance and injustice perpetrated by state authorities for beliefs that do not meet with the approval of the governing or ruling elite. However, at the same time the court must be concerned with, and must remain vigilant to protect, the administration of justice from conduct, including on occasion the expression of views, that corrodes public confidence in and respect for the courts and the justice system. A just and tolerant society must zealously guard the instruments and institutions that preserve justice and tolerance.

This statement of Solomon J recognises the tension at play when the contempt power is being considered and then exercised. These factors arose as well when Judge Haesler SC used the contempt power in R v Kirsten.¹¹⁵

Justice Solomon returned to the contemnor’s sovereign citizen beliefs:¹¹⁶

I have previously outlined that Mr Matic’s beliefs appear to align with those of the self-proclaimed “sovereign citizen” movement. This is a movement that has been gaining popularity and traction in Australia over the last few years but has also been prolific in other jurisdictions for longer. The growing prevalence of this class of beliefs and associated conduct is a matter of concern for the preservation of the authority of the court and the administration of justice. It reinforces the importance of general deterrence in the community. I reiterate again that Mr Matic is at liberty to hold his beliefs but that does not absolve him of the responsibility to adhere to the rule of law which includes acceptance of, and compliance with, court orders.

The High Court has emphasised that the cardinal feature of the power to punish for contempt is that it is “an exercise of the judicial power by the courts to protect the administration of justice”.¹¹⁷ The action taken by the judges in Yap v Matic¹¹⁸ and R v Kirsten¹¹⁹ was considered necessary to protect the administration of justice in those cases.

Will the sovereign citizen tide recede?

The frequency with which sovereign citizen arguments continue to be relied upon in Australian courts does not inspire confidence that the sovereign citizen tide is going out.

It is interesting to note recent cases where sovereign citizen ideology is relied upon but the litigant denies he or she is a sovereign citizen.¹²⁰ In NNRM v Commissioner of Police, Judge Cash KC (who has written curially and extracurially concerning sovereign citizens) said:¹²¹

In this court, the appellant objected to the Magistrate’s reference to his ideas as being similar to those proffered by so-called “sovereign citizens”. He complains this was a defamatory slur and he denied identifying as a “sovereign citizen”. The only curiosity of the appellant’s position is that it demonstrates a shift in the landscape of pseudolaw. Adherents have come to recognise that the term “sovereign citizen” carries negative connotations, and now go to some length to attempt to disassociate themselves from the term, despite repeating the same tired and discredited ideas long associated with so-called “sovereign citizens”.

The adverse media attention given to sovereign citizens in 2023 and 2024 (as noted in footnotes to this article) may explain the desire of some litigants to distance themselves from that label. However, sovereign citizen arguments are still advanced with vigour even by those who reject that description.

The role of the legal profession in addressing and suppressing sovereign citizen ideology has been emphasised.¹²² In Canada, courts have stated that it is improper for a lawyer to take any steps that formalise OPCA materials and/or facilitate pseudolaw strategies.¹²³

In suggesting a broader response to pseudolaw, Hobbs, Young and McIntyre observe that the growth of pseudolaw may, at least in part, be “a consequence of the nature, structure and decisions of our legal system.”¹²⁴

Netolitzky expressed the view in 2023 that “pseudolaw is not going away”:¹²⁵

The modern US-sourced form of pseudolaw has now operated as a low order infestation in the Canadian legal apparatus for over two decades. Pseudolaw will, in all likelihood, still be encountered by judges, lawyers and unfortunate target litigants in the decades to come.

In a strongly worded conclusion to the 2023 article, Netolitzky said:¹²⁶

There are many reasons why pseudolaw is a cause for concern. Pseudolaw promotes useless conflicts and disputes inside and outside courts that ruin personal finances, shatter families, and put government, law enforcement, and court actors at risk. Pseudolaw leads to no win situations.

Modern pseudolaw manifests within a larger conspiratorial matrix that promotes ineffective and illegal social rebellion. Pseudolaw predisposes people down negative life paths. To what degree? Sometimes that is hard to tell.

For example, Las Vegas mass shooter Stephen Paddock was very likely exposed to and influenced by pseudolaw. Did Paddock in 2017 kill 61 people because of those beliefs? Probably not. Strawman Theory and rejection of state authority are an unnatural motive to shoot up a country music festival. But Paddock’s conduct makes a little more sense when one recognizes that pseudolaw is not encountered in isolation, but naturally manifests as part of a larger set of conspiratorial, ungrounded, fearful, paranoid, and hate-driven beliefs. With Paddock, that larger matrix led to sudden and extraordinary violence. And, in that sense, pseudolaw played its part.

To use a biological analogy, pseudolaw is not the cancer, but a contributing carcinogen that leads to many negative events and outcomes. That is why pseudolaw should be studied, monitored, and, ideally, suppressed. Nothing good has come of it, and nothing ever will.

Activities of sovereign citizens cause harm to the community in different ways including the wasteful use of court resources, significant cost to litigants who are targeted by sovereign citizens, the wasteful use of police resources and the risk of injury or death being caused by sovereign citizens in their dealings with police, the harm to children and family members of sovereign citizens including children in custody proceedings or other family law disputes, the deflection and distraction of native title claimants from truly available remedies, and financial and other harm to families of sovereign citizens as a result of their actions in court and elsewhere in the community.

Lastly, and importantly, is the harm done to the community by erosion of confidence in courts and the administration of justice.

The courts can only respond meaningfully to the wave of sovereign citizen advocacy by the firm but fair resolution, according to law, of proceedings where sovereign citizen arguments are advanced.

It is hoped that this approach will see, in time, a reduction (if not obliteration) of pseudolaw and sovereign citizen ideology. It is very much in the public interest that the sovereign citizen tide goes out.

¹Chief Commissioner, Law Enforcement Conduct Commission (NSW), formerly a Justice of the Supreme Court of NSW (2005–2022). This paper does not include information obtained in the performance of my duties as Chief Commissioner.

²An edited version of a paper for a session at the 2025 Supreme, Federal and New Zealand Senior Courts Conference, Adelaide, 18–22/1/2025. This paper was published in (2025) 2 JQR 95.

³G Lester, “The querulant litigant” in Judicial Commission of NSW, Handbook for Judicial Officers, October 2021, accessed 9/4/2025 (originally published as “The vexatious litigant” (2005) 17 JOB 17, accessed 9/4/2025).

⁴The Judicial College of Victoria has a Judicial Steering Committee for sovereign citizens, querulant litigants and high-conflict behaviours and conducted an inaugural cross-jurisdictional event on 1/3/2024 with speakers including Prof J Ogloff, Prof M Pathé and judges from the Country Court and Magistrates Court; Judicial College of Victoria, Annual Report 2023/2024, October 2024, pp 31, 54–55, 60, accessed 15/4/2025; H Hobbs, “Understanding and responding to pseudolaw”, paper presented at the NSW Supreme Court Annual Conference, 26/8/2023; M Pathé, “Sovereign citizens — a psychological perspective”, paper presented at cross-jurisdictional seminar, NSW Supreme Court, 20/2/2024; S Heath and R Chadwick, “Sovereign citizens challenging the courts”, Law Society of WA seminar, 26/2/2024; M Douglass and H Hobbs, “The rise of the sovereign citizen”, paper presented at Australian Judicial Officers Association Colloquium, Canberra, 13/10/2024. See also M Pathé, “What do judicial officers need to know about sovereign citizens?” (2025) 37 JOB 13.

⁵R Beech-Jones, “Seven random points about judging”, speech at the National Judicial College of Australia Orientation Program, Brisbane, 17/3/2024, p 4, accessed 9/4/2025.

⁶AS Bell, “Truth decay and its implications for the judiciary: an Australian perspective”, speech at 4th Judicial Roundtable, Durham University, England, April 2024, para 35, accessed 9/4/2025.

⁷(2012) ABQB 571.

⁸D Netolitzky, “A pathogen astride the mind of men: the epidemiological history of pseudolaw”, paper delivered at the Centre d’expertise et de formation sur les intégrismes religieux et la radicalisation (CEFIR) symposium: sovereign citizens in Montreal, Canada, 3/5/2018, accessed 9/4/2025; D Netolitzky, “After the hammer: six years of Meads v Meads” (2019) 56(4) Alberta Law Review 1167, accessed 9/4/2025; D Netolitzky, “The dead sleep quiet: history of the organised pseudolegal commercial argument phenomenon in Canada — part II” (2023) 60(3) Alberta Law Review 795, accessed 9/4/2025; D Netolitzky “New hosts for an old disease: history of the organised pseudolegal argument phenomenon — part III” (2023) 60(4) Alberta Law Review 971, accessed 9/4/2025.

⁹D Baldino and K Lucas, “Anti-government rage: understanding, identifying and responding to the sovereign citizen movement in Australia” (2019) 14(3) Journal of Policing Intelligence and Counter Terrorism 245; P Jarzabkowski, C Unger and K Meissner, Extremist movements in Australia: a study of individual ideology, Case study, The University of Queensland Business School, September 2023, accessed 9/4/2025; P Taplin, C Holland and L Billing, “The sovereign citizen superconspiracy: contemporary issues in native title anthropology” (2023) 34(2) The Australian Journal of Anthropology 110, accessed 9/4/2025; H Hobbs, S Young and J McIntyre, “The internationalisation of pseudolaw: the growth of sovereign citizen arguments in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand” (2024) 47(1) UNSWLJ 309. A book edited by H Hobbs, S Young and J McIntyre, Pseudolaw and sovereign citizens, Hart Publishing was released in February 2025.

¹⁰State of NSW v Hardy (Final) [2021] NSWSC 900 at [118]–[132]; on appeal, Hardy v State of NSW [2021] NSWCA 338.

¹¹Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Casley [2017] WASC 161 at [15], [17].

¹²A history of Skyring’s litigious activity appears in Skyring v Commissioner of Taxation [2007] FCA 1526 at [7]ff.

¹³Hobbs, Young and McIntyre, “The internationalization of pseudolaw”, above n 9, pp 336–338.

¹⁴Kosteska v Phillips [2011] QCA 266 at [17].

¹⁵Wilson v The Prothonotary [2000] NSWCA 23. In K Mason, Old law, new law — a second Australian legal miscellany, Federation Press, 2014, p 78, Mason observed that following the appeal, “Wilson and his supporters would return to haunt other members of that Court in later years”. See also K Mason and L Reid (eds), Constant guardian, changing times — the Supreme Court of New South Wales 1824–2024, Judicial Commission of NSW, 2024, p 113.

¹⁶In the matter of Bauskis [2006] NSWSC 907; In the matter of Bauskis [2006] NSWSC 908.

¹⁷In Meads v Meads (2012) ABQB 571 at [257], Rooke ACJ observed that “OPCA litigants are known to engage in disruptive and inappropriate in-court conduct” and “sometimes appear with supporters who do the same”. Security concerns have been raised recently in SA regarding activities of sovereign citizens in courthouses: E Henson, “Courts call for extra security to deal with ‘menacing’ sovereign citizens”, Adelaide Advertiser, 21/12/2024.

¹⁸Bauskis v Adams [2007] NSWCA 293.

¹⁹Bauskis v Adams [2008] HCASL 233.

²⁰Attorney General (NSW) v Wilson [2010] NSWSC 1008. Leave to appeal against this declaration was refused: Wilson v Attorney General (NSW) [2011] NSWCA 10.

²¹Attorney General (NSW) v Wilson [2011] NSWSC 221 at [6].

²²J Thomas and J McGregor, “Sovereign citizens: terrorism assessment warns of rising threat from anti-government extremists”, ABC, 30/11/2015, accessed 11/4/2025; Hobbs, Young and McIntyre, “The internationalisation of pseudolaw”, above n 9, pp 12–13.

²³Application by John Wilson [2016] NSWSC 1527; Application by John Wilson (No 2) [2016] NSWSC 1822.

²⁴Perpetual Ltd v Kelso [2008] NSWSC 906. This was during the Global Financial Crisis when vulnerable members of the community were at greater risk of losing their home through mortgage default: P Johnson, “Claims for possession of land following mortgage default — a rising tide” (2008) 20(2) JOB 9, accessed 14/4/2025. Like Skyring (see history at above n 12), Wilson was encouraging vulnerable people to pursue an unwinnable argument.

²⁵Bauskis v Thomson [2011] NSWSC 27 at [5]–[6].

²⁶(2012) ABQB 571.

²⁷K Sheridan v Colin Biggers and Paisley [2019] NSWSC 528.

²⁸Bauskis v Wainhouse [2020] NSWCA 17.

²⁹Essenberg v The Queen [2000] HCATrans 386, refusing special leave to appeal from the decision of the Queensland Court of Appeal in Carnes v Essenberg [1999] QCA 339.

³⁰Essenberg failed again with the same argument in 2002: R v Essenberg [2002] QCA 4; Essenberg v The Queen [2003] HCATrans 836 (special leave refused).

³¹The Wilson and Bauskis cases; Shaw v State of WA [2004] WASC 144; Gargan v Magistrate Dillon [2005] NSWSC 1106; Attorney General for NSW v Gargan [2010] NSWSC 1192; St George Bank v Udowenko [2010] NSWSC 1289; National Australia Bank v Norman [2012] VSC 14; Glew v White [2012] WASC 138; Baker v NSW Police [2013] NSWSC 57; Macdonald v County Court of Victoria [2013] VSC 109; Baker v Attorney General for NSW [2013] NSWCA 329; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bonaccorso (No 3) [2016] NSWSC 1018; Flowers v State of NSW (No 5) [2021] NSWSC 887. To the extent that the argument was based on words in cl 29 of Magna Carta of 1225 (“lawful judgment of his peers”), it is clear that cl 29 was not the basis for development of the jury system: J Spigelman, “Magna Carta: the rule of law and liberty” (2015) 40 Australian Bar Review 212 at 216, accessed 11/4/2025; V Bell, “Magna Carta — resonances in the common law of Australia”, paper presented at Spring Conversazione, Melbourne, 1/10/2015, p 4, accessed 11/4/2025. Trial by jury was not then a known mode of trial: S Rares, “Why Magna Carta still matters”, paper presented at Judicial Conference of Australia Colloquium, Adelaide, 9/10/2015, para 41, accessed 11/4/2025.

³²PW Young (ed), “Current issues” (2004) 78 ALJ 763 at 767.

³³Gargan v Magistrate Dillon [2005] NSWSC 1106 at [30].

³⁴Permanent Custodians Ltd v Virgin Investments Pty Ltd and Palmer [2009] VSC 429.

³⁵National Australia Bank v Norman [2012] VSC 14; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Aitken [2015] WADC 18; Ennis v Credit Union Australia [2016] FCCA 1705; Adelaide City Council v Lepse [2016] SASC 66; Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Woods [2018] FCCA 1815; Bauskis v Wainhouse [2020] NSWCA 17.

³⁶State of NSW v Mathers (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 473. A further extended supervision order for 18 months was made in July 2021: State of NSW v Hardy (Final) [2021] NSWSC 900. The pseudonym “Mathers” was used in the 2019 proceedings because of then pending criminal proceedings against Hardy: State of NSW v Hardy (Final) at [6]–[7]. The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal from the 2021 decision: Hardy v State of NSW [2021] NSWCA 338.

³⁷State of NSW v Hardy (Final) [2021] NSWSC 900 at [125]–[128], [131].

³⁸Netolitzky, “The dead sleep quiet”, above n 8, p 801.

³⁹K Campion, Chasing shadows — the untold and deadly story of terrorism in Australia, Allen and Unwin, 2022, pp 333–334.

⁴⁰L Khalil, Rise of the extreme right: the new global extremism and the threat to democracy, Lowy Institute paper, Penguin Special, 2022, pp 168–169.

⁴¹T Cubitt, A Morgan and I Voce, “Grievances and conspiracy theories as motivators of anti-authority protests” (2024) Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No 693, p 9, accessed 11/4/2025; A Morgan, T Cubitt, A Voce and I Voce, “An experimental study of support for protest causes and tactics and the influence on conspiratorial beliefs” (2024) Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, No 702, accessed 11/4/2025; A Morgan, T Cubitt and I Voce, Participation in anti-authority protests and vulnerability to radicalisation, Research Report No 31, May 2024, p 17, accessed 11/4/2025.

⁴²A Beaini and C Miranda, “This could happen in Australia too — sovereign citizen movement is ‘half a step away from violence’”, Adelaide Advertiser, 10/8/2024.

⁴³S Kesteven and D Carrick, “Magistrates witness a ‘sharp rise’ in sovereign citizen cases brought before the local courts”, ABC, 8/5/2023, accessed 11/4/2025; interview with M Douglass, “Sovereign citizens in the courts”, ABC, Law Report, 19/12/2023, accessed 11/4/2025; M Douglass and H Hobbs, “The rise of the sovereign citizen”, paper presented at Australian Judicial Officers’ Association Colloquium, October 2024. D Heilpern is a retired magistrate and is now the Dean of Law at Southern Cross University. He has been a significant commentator on the impact of sovereign citizens on the Local Court and generally — see B MacKenzie, “Ex-magistrate calls to shut down websites promoting ‘sovereign citizen’ defence for traffic fines”, ABC, 30/11/2023, accessed 11/4/2025. Heilpern participated in a podcast on 16/12/2024 entitled “Pseudo-law and the case of the sovereign citizen: a time waste in court or immunity loophole?”.

⁴⁴Judicial Commission of NSW, “Sovereign citizens — common arguments, rebuttals and caselaw”, revised as at 21/4/2023 (please note this resource is only accessible to magistrates). Judicial Commission of NSW, Equality before the Law Bench Book, 2006–, Section 10, provides advice concerning “Self-represented parties” with [10.5] relating expressly to sovereign citizens. See also Judicial Commission of NSW, Civil Trials Bench Book, 2nd edn, 2002– at [1-0800]–[1-0890] concerning unrepresented litigants and lay advisers.

⁴⁵Police v Gale [2020] TASMC 11; Rossiter v Adelaide City Council [2020] SASC 61; Reynolds v Nonkovic [2023] WASC 326; Stefan v McLachlan [2023] VSC 501; Wells v Queensland Police Service [2024] QDC 38; Handley v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 116; Nikolajuk v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 96; Kelly v Fiander [2024] WASC 275. See V Marsh, “10 times fine for ‘deluded defence’”, Courier Mail, 1/4/2024, a report concerning Wells v Queensland Police Service, above.

⁴⁶Rossiter v Adelaide City Council [2020] SASC 61 at [50], [52].

⁴⁷Re Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2022] VSC 438; Re Finocchiaro; ex parte The Proper Officer [2023] NTSC 23; Cini v First Mortgage Capital Pty Ltd [2023] NSWCA 53; Scordo v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2024] FCA 359; Westpac Banking Corporation v Cahill [2024] WASC 246; Cartwright v Queensland Police Service [2024] QCA 178; GI 451 Pty Ltd v Collins [2024] VSC 610; Nelson v Greenman [2024] VSC 704; Norfina Ltdd v Fish [2024] WASC 471.

⁴⁸Nelson v Greenman [2024] VSC 704 at [68]–[70].

⁴⁹Norfina Ltd v Fish [2024] WASC 471 at [26].

⁵⁰A Bogle, “The rise of a ‘dangerous ideology’ among parents is causing havoc in custody disputes”, The Guardian, 15/12/2024, accessed 11/4/2025. See also K Nguyen and M Workman, “A sovereign citizen group is using a fake court to justify child kidnapping and extortion”, ABC, 17/7/2024, accessed 30/4/2025; K Nguyen, “The ‘sovereign citizens’ who live among us”, ABC News Daily, 24/7/2024, accessed 11/4/2025.

⁵¹Baier and Pitter [2024] FedCFamC2F 586; Pitter and Baier (No 2) [2024] FedCFamCIA 197 (appeal); Planck and Planck [2024] FedCFamCIF 341; Kori and Georgene (No 3) [2024] FedCFamCIF 381; Einarsson and Joshi [2024] FedCFamCIF 423.

⁵²Baier and Pitter [2024] FedCFamC2F 586 at [52], [63], [137].

⁵³Pitter and Baier (No 2) [2024] FedCFamCIA 197 at [15].

⁵⁴[2024] FedCFamCIF 341 at [12]–[20].

⁵⁵NRM v Director General, Department of Justice and Attorney-General [2024] QCAT 157.

⁵⁶NNRM v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 64.

⁵⁷[2021] QDC 216.

⁵⁸(2012) ABQB 571.

⁵⁹R v Sweet [2021] QDC 215 at [9]–[10] (footnotes omitted). Judge Cash KC returned to the topic of sovereign citizens in “A kind of magic: the origins and culture of ‘pseudolaw’”, a paper for the Queensland Magistrates’ State Conference 2022, Brisbane, 26/5/2022, accessed 11/4/2022 and in NNRM v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 64.

⁶⁰[2024] NSWDC 401; G Crivellaro, “The chaotic trial of a sovereign who abducted her kid from a Wollongong park”, Illawarra Mercury, 17/9/2024; D Arvela, “Sovereign citizen charged with contempt during Wollongong District Court trial”, Illawarra Star, 17/9/2024.

⁶¹R v Kirsten (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWDC 401 at [11].

⁶²ibid at [217].

⁶³ibid at [160]–[206].

⁶⁴ibid at [217]–[218].

⁶⁵Diplomat Dan v State of Tasmania [2024] TASCCA 9. See S Powell, “Port Sorell man ‘Dan’ in court over allegations of assaulting wife and throwing acid on police”, ABC, 5/6/2024, accessed 11/4/2025: in this ABC report it was said that “Dan told the jury he believes all lawyers are liars and corrupt, made serious accusations about Tasmania Police officers and made reference to the concept of sovereign citizens and the Magna Carta”.

⁶⁶Diplomat Dan v State of Tasmania [2024] TASCCA 9 at [7]–[9].

⁶⁷ibid at [13].

⁶⁸[2024] NSWDC 476.

⁶⁹ibid at [51]–[52].

⁷⁰[2024] TASCCA 9.

⁷¹M Pitcavage, “Murder of Dallas police officer marks latest in string of violent sovereign citizen encounters with law enforcement”, Anti-Defamation League Centre on Extremism, 9/12/2024, accessed 11/4/2025.

⁷²State of NSW v Hardy (Final) [2021] NSWSC 900 at [118]–[132]; on appeal, Hardy v State of NSW [2021] NSWCA 338.

⁷³State of NSW v Kiskonen (Preliminary) [2021] NSWSC 915; State of NSW v Gavin [2022] NSWSC 84.

⁷⁴Hobbs, Young, and McIntyre, “The internationalisation of pseudolaw”, above n 9, pp 20–21.

⁷⁵Taplin, Holland and Billing, above n 9; A Messenger, “‘Sovereign citizen’ conspiracists targeting Aboriginal Australians put native title claims at risk”, The Guardian, 3/10/2023, accessed 11/4/2025. The involvement of sovereign citizens in the December 2021 fire at Old Parliament House was also considered in Jarzabkowski, Unger and Meissner, above n 9, pp 18–20.

⁷⁶Taplin, Holland, and Billing, above n 9, p 124.

⁷⁷Maher v R [2021] NSWDC 212; Cole v Rigby [2023] NTSC 20, relying upon Walker v State of NSW (1994) 182 CLR 45 at [2] and Love v Commonwealth of Australia (2020) 270 CLR 152 at [102].

⁷⁸R v Thorpe (No 2) [2024] VSC 408.

⁷⁹A Jacobs and H Murphy, “The rise of financial sovereignty — and why some Australians believe they don’t have to pay tax”, ABC, 8/4/2024, accessed 11/4/2025; H Murphy, “Australian Tax Office fires warning shot over ‘hopelessly flawed’ sovereign citizen movement’s tax advice”, ABC, 20/8/2024, accessed 11/4/2025.

⁸⁰Palmer v No Respondent [2023] VSCA 322 where Beach JA referred at [22] to the applicant’s arguments as being “at best mumbo jumbo”.

⁸¹P Quinlan, “The rule of law in a social media age”, Sir Francis Burt Oration 2022, 3/11/2022, pp 18–19, accessed 11/4/2025.

⁸²Hobbs, Young and McIntyre, “The internationalisation of pseudolaw”, above n 9, pp 314–315.

⁸³J Pytyck and G Chaimowitz, “The sovereign citizen movement and fitness to stand trial” (2013) 12(2) International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 149; G Parker, “Competence to stand trial evaluations of sovereign citizens: a case series and primer of odd political and legal beliefs” (2014) 42(3) The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 338; C Paradis, E Owen and G McCullough, “Evaluations of urban sovereign citizens’ competence to stand trial” (2018) 46(2) The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 158; C Sarteschi, “Sovereign citizens: a narrative review with implications of violence towards law enforcement” (2020) 60 Aggression and Violent Behavior 101509.

⁸⁴(2012) ABQB 571 at [160].

⁸⁵Netolitzky, “After the hammer: six years of Meads v Meads” (footnotes omitted), above n 8, pp 1174–1175.

⁸⁶M Pathé, “Sovereign citizens — a psychological perspective”, above n 4. See also Pathé, “What do judicial officers need to know about sovereign citizens?”, above n 4, p 14.

⁸⁷[2024] NSWDC 401 at [11].

⁸⁸Wilson v The Prothonotary [2000] NSWCA 23 at [22]–[24], [38]. Dr McMurdo, psychiatrist, diagnosed obsessive compulsive personality disorder but observed that “this renders him perhaps eccentric, but not mentally ill” (at [24]). Heydon JA (Sheller JA agreeing) said at [38]: “It may not be a mental illness, but it is a mental or personality disorder which, according to Dr McMurdo, is exceedingly unlikely to be treatable”.

⁸⁹[2024] NSWDC 476.

⁹⁰[2024] NSWDC 401.

⁹¹[2024] TASCCA 9.

⁹²Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW), s 132(1)–(3).

⁹³ibid, s 132(7).

⁹⁴R v Kirsten (a pseudonym) [2024] NSWDC 401 at [5]–[16].

⁹⁵ibid at [201]–[206].

⁹⁶[2024] TASCCA 9.

⁹⁷However, a Tasmanian magistrate, in December 2023, charged Diplomat Dan with contempt of court based upon alleged wilful misbehaviour before the Magistrate’s Court: Diplomat Dan v Brown [2024] TASSC 65 at [5].

⁹⁸R v Cameron Hardy [2023] BCPC 65.

⁹⁹R v Hardy [2024] BCCA 254. In agreeing with the order allowing the appeal, Harris JA stated at [52] “that the appellant’s conduct in my view was disgraceful and inexcusable and nothing in my concurrence should be taken to in any way condone the conduct of the appellant”.

¹⁰⁰Stoker v Adecco Gemvale Constructions Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 449 at [41]; Pollard v RRR Corporation Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 110 at [58].

¹⁰¹Rossiter v Adelaide City Council [2020] SASC 61 at [50], [52].

¹⁰²Norfina Ltd v Fish [2024] WASC 471 at [26].

¹⁰³Re Magistrate M M Flynn; ex parte McJannett [2013] WASC 372 at [15].

¹⁰⁴Scordo v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2024] FCA 359 at [50]–[53].

¹⁰⁵[2019] NZHC 853 at [16].

¹⁰⁶James v District Court at Whanganui [2023] NZCA 181 at [17]; Te Pairi v R [2003] NZHC 992 at [14]–[16].

¹⁰⁷Hobbs, Young and McIntyre, “The internationalisation of pseudolaw”, above n 9, p 339.

¹⁰⁸ibid.

¹⁰⁹D Rolph, Contempt, Federation Press, 2023, p 421.

¹¹⁰[2024] NSWDC 401.

¹¹¹Yap v Matic (No 3) [2022] WASC 370; Yap v Matic (No 4) [2022] WASC 422; Yap v Matic (No 7) [2023] WASC 55.

¹¹²Yap v Matic (No 4) [2022] WASC 422 at [19].

¹¹³ibid at [22]–[24].

¹¹⁴Yap v Matic (No 7) [2023] WASC 55 at [21]–[22].

¹¹⁵[2024] NSWDC 401.

¹¹⁶Yap v Matic (No 7) [2023] WASC 55 at [44].

¹¹⁷Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Boral Resources (Vic) Pty Ltd (2015) 256 CLR 375 at [41].

¹¹⁸Yap v Matic (No 3) [2022] WASC 370; Yap v Matic (No 4) [2022] WASC 422; Yap v Matic (No 7) [2023] WASC 55.

¹¹⁹[2024] NSWDC 401.

¹²⁰NNRM v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 64 at [35]; Nikolajuk v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 96 at [11].

¹²¹NNRM v Commissioner of Police [2024] QDC 64 at [35].

¹²²Hobbs, Young and McIntyre, “The internationalisation of pseudolaw”, above n 9, p 341.

¹²³Meads v Meads (2012) ABQB 571 at [643]–[645]; R v Ayyazi [2022] ABQB 412 at [23], [34].

¹²⁴Hobbs, Young and J McIntyre, “The internationalisation of pseudolaw”, above n 9, p 341.

¹²⁵Netolitzky, “New hosts for an old disease”, above n 8, p 1005.

¹²⁶ibid, pp 1014–1015 (footnotes omitted).