Closed court, suppression and non-publication orders

[1-349] Introduction

The powers of a court to make closed court, suppression and non-publication orders are primarily contained in the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010 (“the Suppression Act”) which commenced on 1 July 2011. Provisions commonly relevant in criminal proceedings are also in the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 and the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987.

Consideration of whether orders should be made under any of the relevant statutory provisions should, where practicable, be dealt with at the outset of proceedings. A checklist of the matters to be considered is at the end of this Chapter: see Checklist for suppression orders.

The onus is on the parties to make an application for appropriate orders at the hearing. Such orders may include an application for a pseudonym order or the suppression of certain evidence, such as evidence related to assistance given during the proceedings: Darren Brown (a pseudonym) v R (No 2) [2019] NSWCCA 69 at [13]–[14]. Note the observations of the court concerning the approach usually taken to assistance at [31]–[34], although these must be read in light of HT v The Queen [2019] HCA 40: see Sentencing Bench Book at [12-210] Procedure (in Power to reduce penalties for assistance to authorities).

When a prohibition is to remain in force (as it often does) advise everyone, including the entire jury panel, of the legal position.

Consistent with the general rule that costs are not awarded in criminal proceedings, a court does not have jurisdiction to award costs in respect of applications for suppression and non-publications orders in such proceedings — nothing in the Suppression Act suggests otherwise: R v Martinez (No 7) [2020] NSWSC 361 at [33]ff.

See the Supreme Court of NSW, “Identity theft prevention and anonymisation policy” for guidance as to the publication of personal or private information in court judgments.

See also Supreme Court Practice Note CL 9 and District Court Criminal Practice Note 8, both titled “Removal of judgments from the internet”.

Common law and suppression and non-publication orders

The Suppression Act does not limit or otherwise affect any inherent jurisdiction a court has to regulate its proceedings or deal with contempt of court: s 4.

The implied powers of a court are directed to preserving its ability to perform its functions in the administration of justice: BUSB v R (2011) 80 NSWLR 170 per Spigelman CJ at [28].

[1-350] The principle of open justice

The principle of open justice is a fundamental aspect of the system of justice in Australia and the conduct of proceedings in public is an essential quality of an Australian court of justice. There is no inherent power of the court to exclude the public: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of NSW (2004) 61 NSWLR 344 per Spigelman CJ at [18]. However, in appropriate cases courts have jurisdiction to modify and adapt the content of general rules of open justice and procedural fairness and to make non-publication orders for particular kinds of cases: HT v The Queen (2019) 269 CLR 403 at [44], [46].

Section 6 of the Suppression Act requires a court deciding whether to make a suppression or non-publication order, to take into account that “a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice”. Section 6 must be considered even if one of the grounds of necessity under s 8 (see further below) is established: DRJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2020] NSWCA 136 at [30]. Decisions since the commencement of the Act confirm the continuing importance of the open justice principle: Rinehart v Welker (2011) NSWLR 311 at [26], [32]; Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52 at [9]; Liu v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2018] NSWCCA 159 at [52]–[53]. Section 6 also reflects the legislative intention that orders under the Act should only be made in exceptional circumstances: Rinehart v Welker at [27].

The public interest in open justice is served by reporting court proceedings and their outcomes fairly and accurately: AB (A Pseudonym) v R (No 3) (2019) 97 NSWLR 1046 at [101]; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of NSW [2004] NSWCA 324 at [20]. In some cases, where reporting of particular proceedings is misleading, emotive and encourages vigilante behaviour, the message disseminated may be “antithetical to institutionalised justice” and a non-publication order may not compromise the public interest in open justice: see, for example, AB (A Pseudonym) v R (No 3) at [102]–[110].

The principle of open justice may require publication of a judgment confirming the making of non-publication or suppression orders with appropriate redactions to maintain the anonymity of parties or particular aspects of proceedings as have been determined to be necessary. Although the parties may reach agreement as to appropriate redactions, the court must determine for itself whether the proposed redactions should be the subject of a suppression order, having regard to, in particular, the emphasis in s 6 on the need to safeguard the public interest in open justice: D1 v P1 (No 2) [2012] NSWCA 440 at [6]. The redacted judgment must remain intelligible, particularly as to the matters of principle justifying the decision to suppress the particular information: D1 v P1 (No 2) at [7]. For an example where this course was taken see Medich v R (No 2) [2015] NSWCCA 331.

[1-352] Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010

The Suppression Act confers broad powers on courts to make suppression or non-publication orders: s 7. Such orders may be made at any time during proceedings or after proceedings have concluded: s 9(3). The power in s 7 is broad and may, depending on the particular circumstances, extend to a judicial officer in one court (for example, the District Court) making non-publication orders with the capacity to affect proceedings in another (for example, the Supreme Court): Munshizada v R [2021] NSWCCA 307 at [31]–[33]; cf Sultani v R [2021] NSWCCA 301 at [15]–[16].

A “non-publication order” and a “suppression order” are defined in s 3. A “party” is broadly defined in s 3.

A court can make a suppression or non-publication order on its own initiative or on application by a party to the proceedings or by any other person considered by the court to have sufficient interest in the making of the order: s 9(1). Those persons entitled to be heard on an application are set out in s 9(2)(d) and include news media organisations.

While at common law there were conflicting views as to whether a court could make non-publication orders which were binding on third parties (see Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506 at [23]), a concern to resolve that issue underlies the enactment of s 7: Rinehart v Welker (2011) NSWLR 311 at [25]; see also the “Agreement in Principle Speech” for the Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Bill 2010, NSW, Legislative Assembly, Debates, 29 October 2010, p 27195. This seems to be put beyond doubt by the decision in Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52 where Basten JA (with whom Bathurst CJ and Whealy JA agreed) concluded that, provided they do not purport to bind the “world at large” and that certain conditions are met, orders can be made which are binding on third parties: [92]–[102].

[1-354] Grounds for and content of suppression or non-publication orders

Section 8(1) of the Suppression Act sets out the grounds upon which an order can be made and each is prefaced in terms of whether the order is “necessary”. That term should not be given a narrow construction: Fairfax Digital Australia and New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52 at [8], [45]. What is necessary depends on the particular grounds relied upon in s 8 and the factual circumstances giving rise to the order: Fairfax Digital at [8]. It is sufficient that the order is necessary to achieve at least one of the objectives identified in s 8(1)(a)–(e): Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Qaumi [2016] NSWCCA 97 at [20]. The word “necessary” describes the connection between the proposed order and the identified purpose; its meaning will depend on the context in which it is used: Fairfax Digital at [46]. Mere belief that an order is necessary is insufficient: John Fairfax & Sons Ltd v Police Tribunal (NSW) (1986) 5 NSWLR 465 at 477. Nor is it enough that it appears to the Court that the proposed order is convenient, reasonable or sensible. Whether necessity has been established depends on the nature of the orders sought and the circumstances in which they are sought: D1 v P1 [2012] NSWCA 314 at [48]; Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651 at [31].

Delay in making an application for an order is a relevant consideration when determining whether an order should be made: Darren Brown (a pseudonym) v R (No 2) [2019] NSWCCA 69 at [28]–[30]. Where there has been a delay, the way the proceedings were originally conducted should be considered, although delay of itself does not preclude making an order. For example, in Darren Brown (a pseudonym) v R (No 2), at [38]–[39], the court referred to the “gross delay” in making the application but concluded the particular orders sought should be made because of the serious potential risk to the appellant’s physical safety.

An order may be made even though it has limited utility or may be ineffective: AB (A Pseudonym) v R (No 3) (2019) 97 NSWLR at [116]–[117]; Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW [2018] NSWCA 340 at [25]. Once a ground under s 8(1) is established, an order must be made: AB (A Pseudonym) v R (No 3) at [117]–[118]; Hogan v Australian Crime Commission at [33].

The expression “administration of justice” in s 8(1)(a) extends to the protection of confidential police methods as well as the investigation and detection of crime: R v Elmir [2018] NSWSC 308 at [19]–[20], [23].

In R v Elmir, Davies J made suppression orders with respect to protected images, the methods used to obtain those images and a messaging application used during a police investigation of foreign incursion offences, on the basis those orders were necessary to prevent prejudice to the administration of justice (s 8(1)(a)), the interests of the Commonwealth in relation to national security (s 8(1)(b)) and otherwise necessary in the public interest (s 8(1)(e)): at [23]–[25]. An order preventing publication of a complainant’s name was found to be necessary within s 8(1)(e) in Le v R [2020] NSWCCA 238. It encouraged victims of crime, such as sex workers, who may otherwise be humiliated by reason of their occupation, to report crimes: at [227]–[229]. In such a case, where all other facts could be read by the public, anonymising the complainant’s name encroached on the principle of open justice to a very limited degree: at [229].

In SZH v R [2021] NSWSC 95, a bail application, Garling J made suppression orders relying on s 8(1)(a) to ensure the applicant’s fair trial as the court was required to consider evidence relied on by the Crown, which may not have been admitted in the trial, to determine the strength of the Crown case. Other remedies are available. For example, orders may be made at the beginning of the trial for such decisions to be removed from NSW Caselaw for the duration of any trial, or publication of the judgment deferred until the trial is complete.

Another relevant consideration is whether “the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person”: s 8(1)(c). “Safety” includes psychological safety, including aggravation of a pre-existing mental condition as well as the risk of physical harm, by suicide or other self-harm as a result of the worsening of a psychiatric condition: AB (A Pseudonym) v R (No 3) at [59]. The person’s safety must be considered in the context of all the circumstances, including the nature and severity of the psychological condition and the severity of any possible aggravation. In the context of a risk of self-harm, there should be some expert evidence enabling the court to assess the likelihood and gravity of the risk. Mere embarrassment, discomfort, reputational damage or even financial loss are not sufficient: A Lawyer (a pseudonym) v Director of Public Prosecutions NSW [2020] NSWSC 1713 at [55], [84], [97]. When considering s 8(1)(c), the “calculus of risk approach” should be adopted, which requires consideration of the nature, imminence and degree of likelihood of harm occurring to the person. If the prospective harm is very severe, it may be more readily concluded the order is necessary even if the risk does not rise above a mere possibility: AB (A Pseudonym) v R (No 3) at [56], [59]; Darren Brown (a pseudonym) v R (No 2) at [37].

In A Lawyer (a pseudonym) v Director of Public Prosecutions NSW, the possible further exacerbation of the appellant’s mother’s psychological state was not of such gravity and prejudice to her safety that the risk was above the level that might reasonably be regarded as acceptable, having regard to the competing interest in open justice.

In Lacey (a pseudonym) v Attorney General for New South Wales [2021] NSWCA 27 the court concluded that the “otherwise necessary” requirement in s (8)(1)(e) could, in circumstances involving cultural issues, operate to extend the effect of s 8(1)(d) to proceedings involving matters other than offences of a sexual nature: at [27]–[31]; [41]–[43]; [85]. The offender, an Aboriginal teenage girl, sought an order prohibiting men from viewing video footage of her being strip-searched. The court found a magistrate may have the power to make such an order.

It may be necessary to make separate (and different) orders in respect of different types of information in the same proceedings. See for example, Bissett v Deputy State Coroner [2011] NSWSC 1182 where RS Hulme J concluded that the nature of the medium, publication of which was sought to be suppressed, was a relevant matter to be taken into account. In that case, his Honour concluded that a DVD of relevant events was likely to have a greater impact than the transcript of evidence and that publication of the DVD should therefore be suppressed: at [25]–[27].

Limited non-publication orders may be appropriate in some cases. For example, in State of NSW v Williamson (No 2) [2019] NSWSC 936, limited orders, that there be no publication of his address or his employer’s identity or location, were made in respect of the defendant, a high risk offender who had served his sentence. Those orders were necessary so his rehabilitation and ability to refrain from re-offending would not be jeopardised. Given the limited scope of the order, it only infringed any interest in open justice to the smallest extent: State of New South Wales v Williamson (No 2) at [42]–[43].

In some cases, consideration may be required of the interaction between orders made under the Suppression Act and statutory protections provided under other Acts. Orders under the Suppression Act should not conflict with orders or directions made under other Acts: Medich v R (No 2) [2015] NSWCCA 331 at [25]. In Medich v R (No 2), the court considered that, in the particular circumstances, a partial non-publication order was required for a judgment dealing with whether a compulsory examination justified a permanent stay, to avoid nullifying a non-disclosure direction under s 13(9) of the New South Wales Crime Commission Act 1985 (rep): at [26]–[27]. See also R v AB (No 1) (2018) 97 NSWLR 1015 where the court concluded that orders under the Suppression Act were not necessary since s 15A of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 applied and non-compliance with s 15A did not meet the requirements of necessity in s 8 of the Suppression Act: at [39]–[40]. See also [1-359] Self-executing prohibition of publication provisions.

It is important that the right of certain persons to waive a statutory protection, such as in ss 15D and 15E of the Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987, not be foreclosed by the unnecessary making of an order under the Suppression Act.

As to necessity at common law see: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Ryde Local Court (2005) 62 NSWLR 512 per Spigelman CJ at [40]–[45]; O’Shane v Burwood Local Court (NSW) [2007] NSWSC 1300 at [34]. See also BUSB v R (2011) 80 NSWLR 170 per Spigelman CJ at [33] which addressed the test of necessity in the context of a screening order.

Take-down orders

A take-down order will fail the necessity test under s 8(1) if it is futile. However, an order will not necessarily be futile merely because the court is unable to remove all offending material from the internet or elsewhere, or the material is available on overseas websites: AW v R [2016] NSWCCA 227 at [17]; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Quami (2016) 93 NSWLR 384 at [83]; Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52 at [76]. Where the application for a take-down order relates to proceedings before a jury, the test of necessity will not readily be satisfied without considering whether the jury is likely to abide by the judge’s directions to decide the matter only by reference to the evidence: Fairfax Digital at [77]. However, full effect should be given to the received wisdom that jurors act responsibly and in accordance with their oath, including complying with directions of the trial judge: AW v R at [16]; Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Quami at [90].

Content of the order

An order must specify:

  • the grounds on which it was made: s 8(2)

  • any exceptions or conditions to which it is subject: s 9(4)

  • the information to which it applies: s 9(5)

  • the place to which it applies, which may be anywhere in the Commonwealth. An order can only apply outside NSW where the court is satisfied that is necessary to achieve the order’s purpose: s 11

  • the period for which the order applies: s 12.

It is preferable to specify a particular period and not to make an order that remains in force “until further order”. Such an order is difficult to reconcile with the statutory obligation in s 12(2) to ensure an order operates for no longer than is reasonably necessary: DRJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2020] NSWCA 136 at [46]–[47].

When information on the internet is involved, relevant internet service providers must be identified and given the opportunity to remove relevant material before an order is sought. This could be done by the Director of Public Prosecutions. If the requested action was not taken within a reasonable time, the Director could seek an order in respect of that material: Fairfax Digital at [94]. The test of necessity will not usually be satisfied unless such a request has been made and the parties, after a reasonable opportunity, have failed, or have indicated they do not intend, to remove the relevant material: Fairfax Digital at [98].

See R v Perish (2011) NSWSC 1102; R v Perish [2011] NSWSC 1101; R v DEBS [2011] NSWSC 1248; X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Specialty Network [2011] NSWSC 1272 for examples of types and forms of orders made under the Act and those parts of s 8(1) relied upon by the court making the relevant order.

It may be necessary to take appropriate steps to ensure the media is notified of either a suppression or non-publication order. In the Supreme and District Courts this is done by the associate notifying the Supreme Court’s Public Information Officer.

Review and appeals

Orders made under the Act are subject to review and appeal: ss 13–14. Section 13 is confined to a review by the original court which granted the relevant order while s 14 deals with an appeal by leave, either in respect of the original order or the order of that court on a review: D1 v P1 [2012] NSWCA 314 at [42]. Given the powers under s 14(5) to admit additional or substituted evidence, together with the fact that, subject to leave, a review under s 13 and an appeal under s 14 appear to be alternatives, the hearing on the appeal is a hearing de novo: D1 v P1 at [43]; Fairfax Digital at [6]. As to who may make an application under s 13 for review of an order see JB v R [2019] NSWCCA 48 at [25]–[27]. In that case the court concluded the NSW Bar Council had standing to make an application for review.

[1-356] Other statutory provisions empowering non-publication or suppression

The Suppression Act does not limit the operation of a provision under any other Act permitting a court to make orders of this kind: s 5. Other provisions fall into three broad groups: those conferring a power on a court to make suppression or non-publication orders in particular circumstances, those requiring or enabling the closing of a court and those that either require the making of an order for non-publication or prohibit publication of information.

See also Non-publication and suppression orders at [62-000]ff of the Local Court Bench Book, in particular [62-040], [62-060] and [62-080] for comprehensive lists of provisions for automatic non-publication or suppression orders and of those requiring a court order.

Following is a non-exhaustive list of specific provisions enabling a court to make suppression or non-publication orders. Many will not require consideration in the context of a criminal trial.

  • Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, s 45(2). Note s 45(1) which positively prohibits publication or broadcast in respect of children

  • Evidence (Audio and Audio Visual Links) Act 1998, s 15(c)

  • Surveillance Devices Act 2007, s 42(5)–(6)

  • Evidence Act 1995, s 126E(b), relating to “Professional confidential relationship privilege”. Such an order constitutes a diminution of the operation of the open justice principle, the justification for such an exception should be narrowly construed: Nagi v DPP [2009] NSWCCA 197 at [30]

  • Lie Detectors Act 1983, s 6(3).

Commonwealth provisions

The relevant Commonwealth provisions include:

  • Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth), s 16A

  • Service and Execution of Process Act 1992 (Cth), s 96

  • Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth), s 47.

[1-358] Closed courts

Protection of complainants from publicity in proceedings for a “prescribed sexual offence”

Where proceedings are in respect of a prescribed sexual offence, as defined in s 3 Criminal Procedure Act 1986, ss 291, 291A and 291B of that Act require that certain proceedings, or parts of proceedings, for a prescribed sexual offence be held in camera.

When a complainant’s evidence is being given or heard before the court (whether this is in person or via an audio visual or audio recording) proceedings are to be held in camera unless otherwise ordered: s 291(1). Where a record of the original evidence of the complainant is tendered in proceedings by the prosecutor under Ch 3, Pt 5, Div 3 Criminal Procedure Act, the record does not need to be tendered in camera: s 291(6).

Media access to such proceedings is governed by s 291C of the Act. The court may make arrangements for media representatives to view or hear evidence or a record of it, in circumstances where the media is not entitled to be present in the courtroom: s 291C(2). For details of such procedures see District Court Criminal Practice Note 4, “Media access to sexual assault proceedings heard in camera”.

Section 302(1) of the Act may also be relevant. That section empowers the court to order that all or part of evidence related to a protected confidence be given in camera.

Children in criminal proceedings

The court may exclude from proceedings involving children anyone not directly interested in the proceedings: s 10 Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987. Any family victim is entitled to remain: s 10(1)(c). Media representatives may remain unless the court otherwise directs: s 10(1)(b). Section 15A of the Act prohibits the publication or broadcasting of the names of children involved as offenders, witnesses, or brothers and sisters of victims in criminal proceedings. (See further at [1-359] below.)

As to Children’s Court proceedings: see ss 104–105 Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998.


Terrorism (Police Powers) Act 2002, s 26P requires that proceedings heard in the Supreme Court concerning applications making or revoking a preventative detention order or a prohibited contact order must be heard in the absence of the public. See also ss 27Y and 27ZA.

Witness protection

Witness Protection Act 1995, s 26 provides that where the identity of a participant in the witness protection program is in issue or may be disclosed, the court must, unless of the view that the interests of justice require otherwise, hold that part of the proceedings in private and make an order suppressing the publication of the evidence given to ensure the participant’s identity is not disclosed. See also s 31E which concerns questioning, with leave, a witness that may disclose a protected person’s protected identity.

Commonwealth provisions

The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and Criminal Code (Cth) contain provisions enabling a court to exclude all or some members of the public and make orders concerning the non-publication of evidence in particular proceedings. For example, s 15YP of the Crimes Act provides that a court may exclude people from the courtroom when certain witnesses, including child witnesses, vulnerable adult complainants or special witnesses (defined in s 15YAB) are giving evidence in particular proceedings. Publishing information identifying such witnesses is an offence: s 15YR(1).

Section 93.2 of the Code, in Pt 5.2 titled “Espionage and related offences”, empowers a court to exclude members of the public from all or part of a hearing if satisfied it is in the interests of Australia’s national security. Orders may also be made that no report of the whole or specified part of the hearing be published. The contravention of an order is an offence: s 93.2(3). See also the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) which establishes a regime for dealing with national security information in federal criminal proceedings. For a discussion of the operation of s 31, which governs non-disclosure orders that can be made under that Act, see R v Collaery (No 7) [2020] ACTSC 165 at [41]–[43], [102]–[110].

[1-359] Self-executing prohibition of publication provisions

A number of statutory provisions prohibit the publication of information in particular circumstances.

Note: Where a statutory protection automatically applies, it is important that court reporters endorse the transcript to this effect and do not attribute it to the court having made an “order”.

See the following:

  • Bail Act 2013, s 89(1) prohibits publication of association conditions in terms similar to Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, s 100H (see below).

  • Child Protection (Offenders Prohibition Orders) Act 2004, s 18.

  • Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987, s 15A prohibits the publication or broadcast of the names of children involved as offenders, witnesses, or brothers and sisters of child victims in criminal proceedings (see below).

  • Crimes Act 1900, s 578A prohibits the publication of matters identifying a complainant in proceedings in respect of a prescribed sexual offence. As to publication, once proceedings are finalised see: ss 578A(4)(a)–(f) and 578A(3).

    The prohibition in s 578A(2) extends to the reporting of appeals even if a prescribed sexual offence, which was part of the original proceedings, is not the subject of the appeal, because publication of the identity of the victim of the offence(s) the subject of the appeal would identify them as the complainant in the original proceedings: Z (a pseudonym) v R [2022] NSWCCA 8 at [56].

  • Crimes (Appeal and Review) Act 2001, s 111.

  • Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007, s 45(1) prohibits the publication of names or identifying information concerning children in AVO proceedings.

  • Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999, s 100H prohibits the publication or broadcast of persons named in non-association orders (other than the offender) made under s 17A(2)(a), or any information calculated to identify any such person.

  • Evidence Act 1995, s 195 prohibits the publication of prohibited questions, the nature of which are set out in that section.

  • Law Enforcement (Controlled Operations) Act 1997, s 28.

  • Law Enforcement and National Security (Assumed Identities) Act 2010, s 34.

  • Status of Children Act 1996, s 25.

Publication of children’s names in criminal proceedings

Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987, s 15A prohibits the publication or broadcast of the names of children involved as offenders, witnesses, or brothers and sisters of child victims in criminal proceedings. Where there has been breach of an order under s 15A(1), proceedings should be commenced under s 15A(7) instead of seeking a non-publication order under s 7 of the Suppression Act: R v AB (No 1) (2018) 97 NSWLR 1015 at [38]-[39].

Sections 15B–15F provide exceptions to the prohibition on publication or broadcast in certain circumstances including where:


an order has been made by a court authorising the publication or broadcast of the name of a person convicted of a serious children’s indictable offence: s 15C(1). The matters to be considered by the court are set out in s 15C(3).


a person who is 16 years or above at the time of publication or broadcasting has consented: s 15D(1)(b). As to the circumstances in which a child of 16 or 17 years of age can consent see s 15D(3). A court has power to make orders under s 15D(1)(a). The matters to consider are set out in s 15D(2).


the name of a deceased child is published or broadcast with the consent of the child’s senior available next of kin: s 15E(1). See, for example, R v ES (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 1708 at [1] where the deceased child’s mother consented to her child being referred to by the name Liana.

Note also that s 15E(5) enables the court to make an order for publication or broadcast of a deceased child’s name if no senior next of kin is available to give consent and the court is satisfied the public interest requires it. In determining whether an order for publication should be made, the court must consider the circumstances of the particular case and the public interest. In assessing the “public interest”, a broad concept, the court looks at the circumstances of the case: R v Sam (No 1) [2009] NSWSC 542 at [13]–[14]. In R v Sam (No 1), which involved manslaughter by criminal negligence occasioned by the child’s parents failing to obtain appropriate medical treatment, Johnson J was satisfied the public interest in open justice meant the child’s name should be published. In R v BW & SW (No 2) [2009] NSWSC 595, R A Hulme J concluded that given the atrocious circumstances in which the child died and the evidence she was subject to severe neglect, dignity and respect for her life and memory warranted publication of her middle name “Ebony”: R v BW & SW (No 2) at [19]–[26]. This addressed concerns associated with not identifying her siblings who were 16 years old and younger: at [26]–[27].

Commonwealth provisions

Section 15MK Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) makes provision for orders necessary or desirable to protect the identity of an “operative” for whom a witness identity protection certificate has been filed. The “necessary or desirable” test in s 15MK(1) has a lower threshold than that of necessity under s 8 Suppression Act or the common law as discussed in BUSB v R (2011) 80 NSWLR 170 at [30]–[33]; R v Elmir [2018] NSWSC 308 at [28]. See also Evidence given by alternative means at [1-380]ff.

Section 15YR(1) Crimes Act 1914 provides for an offence of publishing a matter which identifies a child witness or child complainant in a child proceeding or a vulnerable adult complainant in a vulnerable adult proceeding. Each proceeding is defined in ss 15Y, 15YA and 15YAA.

A person commits an offence if:


the person publishes any matter; and


the person does not have the leave of the court to publish the matter; and


the matter:

(i) identifies another person, who is a person to whom subsection (1A) applies (the vulnerable person) in relation to a proceeding, as being a child witness, child complainant or vulnerable adult complainant; or

(ii) is likely to lead to the vulnerable person being identified as such a person; and


the vulnerable person is not a defendant in the proceeding.

Penalty: imprisonment for 12 months, or 60 penalty units, or both.

Section 28(2) Witness Protection Act 1994 (Cth) provides, inter alia, the court must make such orders relating to the suppression of publication of evidence given before it as, in its opinion, will ensure that the identity of a National Witness Protection Program participant is not made public.

Checklist for suppression orders

Relevant legislation: Court Suppression and Non-publication Orders Act 2010

Note: certain other legislation contain mandatory provisions that may obviate the need to make suppression or non-publication orders in particular proceedings or in relation to particular persons (eg children and complainants in prescribed sexual assault proceedings) or witnesses. See [1-356] Other statutory provisions empowering no-publication or suppression; [1-358] Closed courts; [1-359] Self-executing prohibition of publication provisions.


Power to make a suppression or non-publication order (the order) arises under s 7 of the Act.


The order may be made by the court on its own initiative or upon application by a party to the proceedings or any other person the court considers has a sufficient interest in the making of the order: s 9. The persons entitled to appear and be heard on an application are listed in s 9(2).


The order can be made at any time during the proceedings or after they have concluded: s 9(3) (although if an application is made some time after the conclusion of the proceedings, the delay may be taken into account in determining whether it is appropriate to make the order).


In determining whether to make the order the court must:


take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice: s 6; see further [1-350] The principle of open justice.


determine the ground/s on which the order may be made: s 8; see further [1-354] Grounds for and content of suppression or non-publication orders. In a case where s 8(1)(d) arises for consideration with respect to a defendant in criminal proceedings for an offence of a sexual nature note s 8(3).


Upon making the order the court must specify:


the ground on which it was made: s 8(2);


the information to which it applies: s 9(5);


any exceptions or conditions to which it is subject: s 9(4);


the place to which it applies, which may be anywhere in the Commonwealth. However, an order can only apply outside NSW where the court is satisfied that is necessary to achieve the order’s purpose: s 11; see further in [1-354] Content of order. The preferable approach is that the order operate throughout the Commonwealth.


the period of the order: s 12.


Ensure a copy of the order is:


entered on Justicelink


disseminated to the relevant Court’s Media Officer for circulation as appropriate.